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ABSTRACT & KEYWORDS
This thesis examines the current state of the criminal law’s interaction with mentally ill
persons, with a specific interest in this interaction during pre-trial phases such as arrest
and bail. It argues that the current provisions in the Criminal Code of Canada that allow
for limited instances of pre-trial mental health assessments for adults are insufficient. The
current options, including assessments to determine “not criminally responsible for
reasons of mental disorder” or “fitness”, are not applicable in many situations. Other
options available to accused outside of the Criminal Code are also lacking, as they are
limited to the Mental Health Act, and the efforts of the sparsely situated mental health
courts across the country. The focus for this paper is the resulting gap which leaves
mentally ill persons untreated in their illness for longer than is necessary, thus increasing
their chance of re-offending or breaching their court-imposed order – if they are given
bail at all. This paper explores other potential options to assist mentally ill offenders who
are in need of psychiatric intervention. One such option will be a comparison to the
section 34 assessment option under the Youth Criminal Justice Act for those under 18
years of age. This discussion compares relevant legislation, leading case law, theoretical
foundations and doctrinal legal scholarship with a hope of providing guidance for future
legislation.

INDEX TERMS: bail, bail hearing, show cause, show cause hearing, grounds for
detention, primary grounds, secondary grounds, tertiary grounds, pre-trial stage, mental
health, mental illness, mental disorder, depression, major depression, major depressive
disorder, anxiety, bi-polar, schizophrenia, psychosis, psychotic, personality disorder,
suicidal ideation, accused, accused person, not criminally responsible, not criminally
responsible for reason of mental disorder, unfit, fitness, young person, section 34
assessment, assessment, mental health assessment
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Part 1
Introduction to Mental Health Considerations and Bail
“Providing opportunities to receive treatment, not imposing punishment, is the just
and appropriate response… The need for treatment rather than punishment is
rendered even more acute by the fact that the mentally ill are often vulnerable and
victimized in the prison setting, as well as by changes in the health system that
many suggest result in greater numbers of the mentally ill being caught up in the
criminal process.” 1
-Justice McLachlin (as she then was) of the Supreme Court of Canada

Mental illness and the criminal law have been intertwined for centuries. The two
have shared a confusing and often difficult relationship. But in the last century, it
can be argued that efforts have been made to better that relationship.
Since at least 1991, the Supreme Court of Canada has been hearing litigation
involving mentally ill accused persons,2 often requiring Parliament to reassess its
treatment of mentally ill persons involved in the criminal justice system. As just one
example, Swain resulted in the Supreme Court of Canada forcing the government to
abandon its former regime dealing with mentally ill persons incapable of having the
mens rea3 to commit their alleged crime due to their mental disorder. 4 Striking
down its former regime required the government to reconsider how it dealt with
persons who were too mentally ill to understand the consequences of their
otherwise criminal behavior. This dialogue led to the creation of Part XX.1 of the
Criminal Code,5 a Part dealing with mental disorder. It includes the provision of “not
criminally responsible for reason of mental disorder” (“NCR”), which addressed the
Winko v British Colombia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] SCJ No 31¶41
[Winko].
2 R. v Swain, [1991] 1 SCR 933 [Swain].
3 In order to be found guilty of a crime, an accused person must have both the
necessary actus reus [physical act], and mens rea [mental intention] of the requisite
offence with which they are charged. If one of these elements is missing, the accused
person cannot be found guilty of the crime.
4 Swain, supra note 2, ¶150.
5 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [the Criminal Code].
1
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courts concerns in Swain.6 It also codified the ability for an assessment to be
ordered where the accused person is presenting as incapable of understanding the
proceedings against them on account of their mental disorder. This latter test is
often referred to as a “fitness” assessment. Some other options also exist, but are so
sparse as to not fully respond to the issue. For example, mental health courts and
the Mental Health Act offer some promise for those who find themselves in the
system, but neither is consistent. As we will explore, the options open to adult
accused are lacking.
For its part, Parliament has recognized the importance of adequately addressing
mental health concerns. One such example is the allowance for assessments under
section 34 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.7 This legislated assessment option is
commendable. It allows for young persons8 to be assessed for issues relating to
mental health, often leading to a care plan being put in place to address any
concerns explored through the process. To qualify for a section 34 assessment, the
young person simply needs to consent to the assessment together with the
prosecutor, or one of three conditions must be present:
(i)

the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the young person
may be suffering from a physical or mental illness or disorder, a
psychological disorder, an emotional disturbance, a learning disability
or a mental disability,

(ii)

the young person’s history indicates a pattern of repeated findings of
guilt…; or

(iii)

the young person is alleged to have committed a serious violent
offence.9

Of interest is the ability for courts to order these assessments at any point in the
proceedings – including pre-trial phases, like bail.10
Ibid, Part XX.1.
Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c.1, section 34 [YCJA].
8 The YCJA deals exclusively with young persons, defined as those who are twelve
years old or older, but less than eighteen years old. Ibid, s. 2.
9 Ibid, s. 34(1)(b)
6
7
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In addition to the section 34 assessment tool provided by the YCJA, young persons
also have the ability to be assessed for fitness or NCR considerations under the
Criminal Code. Conversely, while adult accused persons have the NCR and fitness
assessment regimes, they have few other options available to them to explore their
mental health issues and to create a plan of treatment.
This thesis will explore the resulting gaps left for adult accused persons suffering
from mental health issues, caused by the limited options provided under the
Criminal Code and any other potentially relevant legislation. It will argue that
opportunities are being missed at earlier stages of the criminal process to help those
suffering from mental health issues, leaving them more likely to re-offend while out
on bail – if they are even granted bail. The treatment options available to mentally ill
persons is already scant, and becomes even more fleeting for those caught up in the
criminal justice system. It will be argued that more money and resources are spent
in justice system processes like investigations, re-arrests, court proceedings, and
detention of accused persons, than if the system simply offered treatment at an
earlier stage of the process. Treatment of mental health issues could instead avoid
re-offending by those dealing with such problems.
While sentencing offers some other options for additional assistance, waiting until
the accused person has been found guilty is not ideal either. It means often waiting
months, and sometimes years, before they are treated. While this respects the
principle of innocence until proven guilty, it ignores the reality that 63% of charges
result in findings of guilt.11 It also ignores the fact that the accused, who is suffering
in real time, is left untreated with the underlying behavior causing their criminality.
To be sure, this thesis does not argue that every mentally ill person is necessarily
Bail is the ability of an accused person to stay out of custody, often on terms and
conditions, while awaiting the disposition of their criminal proceedings.
11 Statistics Canada, Adult Criminal Court Statistics in Canada, 2013/2014, (Ottawa:
StatCan, 28 September 2015) at 3.
10

3

guilty of the crime they have been charged with. Instead, it recognizes that we can
still respect the right to be presumed innocent by maintaining their rights to bail
and trial, while being proactive about treatment opportunities for those who are
arguably the most vulnerable. Such an approach to mentally ill accused persons has
the additional benefit of treating those who will ultimately not be found guilty of
their alleged crime, but nevertheless betters their future prospects all the same.
Jill Presser and Anita Szigeti are two leading Ontario criminal defence lawyers in the
area of mental disorders. They have written that “[m]entally disordered accused are
often among the most vulnerable and the most marginalized people in our
society.”12 With this notion in mind, this thesis argues that we must extend the
concepts of rehabilitation and treatment, as discussed by Justice McLachlin in
Winko, to all accused persons suffering from mental health disorders. To accomplish
this, legislation is suggested for the Criminal Code that mirrors section 34 of the
YCJA.13

1.1 A Roadmap:
Found next in our discussion, Part 2 will set the context for our discussion – bail. As
the John Howard Society has written, “[w]e have a bail problem in Ontario”.14 Bail is
often the first interaction between an accused person and the criminal justice
system. It is a crucial interaction, and one that allows opportunity for intervention
early on in the process. Exploring the current state of mental health assessments
will assist our bail system and accused persons alike, and so, we will start, with a
doctrinal review of the laws on bail.

Anita Szigeti and Jill Presser, “The Responsible Approach to the Issue of Criminal
Responsibility”, For the Defence 32:5 (3 July 2011) 26.
13 Supra, note 7 s. 34.
14 The John Howard Society, “Reasonable Bail?” (2013) The Centre of Research,
Policy and Program Development.
12
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Part 3 will then explore in depth the current options available to adult accused
persons for mental health assessments. NCR and fitness assessments are the main
options, but it will be seen that these options suffer from a “timing” issue, as well as
the need for the accused to be suffering in the specific way of not being able to
understand the consequences of their actions.15 The remaining instances of mental
health interacting with the criminal justice system, like the Mental Health Act and
specialty courts, do not provide a consistent approach. We will review some of these
responses to the issue, and critique each in turn. Because each option has significant
limitations, it is argued that they are insufficient given the prevalence of mentally-ill
accused persons appearing in court.
In Part 4, we will look to the YCJA. This will include a review of section 34 in more
detail, including its drawbacks and potential for fine-tuning. This will allow us then
to flow into a comparative analysis, which will be completed in Part 5. There, we will
consider whether a section 34 assessment option could work in the adult context.
We will consider the reasons for reform to our current system, and the argument
will be made that as a society, we have an ethical responsibility to better deal with
our mentally ill. Consideration is given to what such a legislated option should look
like, and also the potential resistance to such an option.
The overarching theme of this discussion is that a better assessment option is
needed in the adult context in order to help remedy the bail problem described by
the John Howard Society. As one jurist offered:
“…the people who suffer mental disorders are the ones who are at the bottom of
the heap, when it comes to services being provided by the provincial
government.”16
Section 92 of the Constitution Act17 leaves the administration of justice and the
management of hospitals to the provincial government. Therefore, requiring the
Supra, note 5 s. 16(1).
Janet Leiper, “Cracks in the Façade of Liberty: The Resort to Habeas Corpus to
Enforce Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code” (2009) 55 CLQ 134 at page 14.
15
16
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provincial government to complete assessments and offer treatment to mentally ill
offenders is a solution that has likely been thought of by more jurists, practitioners,
and scholars than necessary. Yet despite how obvious this proposition is, we
continue to go without the solution. This solution is necessary in order to fix so
many of the gaps found in our system – arguably both in the criminal and medical
spheres. We cannot wait for a case to make it to the Supreme Court before
Parliament is forced to respond; change can and should come from the legislature
and our provincial governments as soon as practicable – much like the rate in which
we should be responding to mental health concerns. Justice McLachlin’s comments
in Winko, reproduced at the outset of this chapter,18 were made in the context of the
NCR and fitness regime in the Criminal Code. It is argued here that it is time to
extend this promise to our vulnerable and mentally ill by providing the dignity and
treatment they deserve at every stage in which they interact with our system.

Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
Winko, supra note 1: “Providing opportunities to receive treatment, not imposing
punishment, is the just and appropriate response… The need for treatment rather
than punishment is rendered even more acute by the fact that the mentally ill are
often vulnerable and victimized in the prison setting, as well as by changes in the
health system that many suggest result in greater numbers of the mentally ill being
caught up in the criminal process.”

17
18
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1.2 An Illustration: Mental Health Assessment Options
for Adult & Youth Accused
The following chart provides a visual representation of the issue this thesis seeks to
explore.

7

Part 2
Setting the Context: Bail Law in Canada
“In Ontario today, we spent hundreds of millions of dollars detaining legally
innocent people every year. Our provincial jails are overcrowded and at
capacity; prisoners, mostly on remand, sleep two to three to a cell designed for
one, at times on a mattress on the floor. At the same time, crime rates are lower
today than ever. There is something wrong with this picture.”19
-The John Howard Society

Bail is a term most individuals recognize and can understand from the various
depictions of the process presented in popular media. Interestingly though, in
Canada, “bail” is not the true name of the proceedings under the Criminal Code.
Instead, the release of an accused person from custody is called “judicial interim
release”,20 while the process to determine release is called a “show cause hearing”.21
Despite its technical name, “bail” is still the most common term for this process, and
even the Charter refers to it as such when it guarantees the right to “reasonable
bail”.22 Thus, it is the term we will continue to employ for the purposes of this
discussion.
The concept of bail is one that seems relatively straight-forward: pre-trial detention
is to be used with restraint.23 Not only is this guaranteed by the Charter via section
11(e),24 but also by the Criminal Code.25 In section 515(1) of the Code, this plays out
as an instruction to courts to release the accused on their giving of an undertaking,
without conditions, unless the Crown can show cause why that is not justified.26
Supra, note 13.
Criminal Code, supra note 5 Part XVI broadly, and section 515 specifically.
21 Ibid, s. 515(5).
22 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 at section 11(e).
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Criminal Code, supra note 5.
26 Ibid, s. 515(1) and (3).
19
20
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Justification can be found by courts in one of three grounds provided under section
515(10) of the Code.27 The primary ground, and arguably the ground that should do
the majority of the work, considers whether the accused is likely to return to court
do deal with their charges.28 The secondary ground considers whether protection or
safety of the public is needed, including the likelihood of whether the accused will
commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice.29 This
ground is largely speculative, and therefore problematic. We will explore these
issues as we move through our review. The tertiary ground, and the least commonly
invoked of the three, is the newest ground. It is employed to detain those accused
whose release would cause a loss of confidence in the administration of justice.30
While this may seem simple enough, our bail processes are anything but straightforward. Provisions within the Criminal Code reduce the presumption of conditionless bail. For examples of this proposition, consider the provisions requiring more
formal processes for those crimes falling within section 469 like murder,31 that
reverse the onus to the accused person for certain types of offences,32 and allow
Courts to require accused to follow conditions, which can include the requirement
of sureties (or jailers in the community), in order for the accused to be released.33
These exceptions to the otherwise presumptive rule of bail has led to increased
levels of condition-filled bail orders, and worse – detention. A literature review on
this subject paints a persuasive picture of the prevalence of this problem.34 Many of
Ibid s. 515(10).
Ibid s. 515(10)(a).
29 Ibid s. 515(10)(b).
30 Ibid s. 515(10)(c).
31 Ibid ss. 515(1) and 515(11).
32 Ibid ss. 515(6) and 524(9).
33 Ibid s. 515(2).
34 For just a few examples, see:
Allan Manson, “Pre-Sentence Custody and the Determination of a Sentence (Or how
to make a mole hill out of a mountain)” (2004) 49 CLQ 292;

27
28
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these contributions to the discussions will be considered in more detail as we
proceed.
While the current state of bail in Canada is troublesome, it is not that bail laws in
Canada have really ever been exemplary. We have experienced an ongoing battle to
balance competing principles of safety of the public with individual rights to
freedom and liberty. Mentally ill accused have consistently presented challenges for
bail courts. Understanding this history is important in order to understand the
current state of the law, and so we begin with a historical review of the law on bail.

2.1 A Brief History of Bail Law
2.1.i The English Influence
Like much of Canada’s legal history, we look to England as the starting point of bail
law. Bail is likely an impossible concept to pinpoint to a particular piece of
legislation, a specific case, or a movement which brought it about. Instead, bail

Christopher Sherrin, “Excessive Pre-Trial Incarceration” (2012) 75 Saskatchewan
Law Review 55-96;
Daniel Kiselbach, “Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure: Preventative Detention and the
Presumption of Innocence” (1988) 31 CLQ 168;
Don Stuart, “St. Cloud: Widening the Public Confidence Ground to Deny Bail will
Worsen Deplorable Detention Realities” (2015) 10 CR (7th) 337;
James Stribopolous, “The Forgotten Right: Section 9 of the Charter, Its Purpose and
Meaning” (2008) 40 SCLR (2d) 211-248;
Jane B. Sprott and Nicole M. Myers, “Set Up to Fail: The Unintended Consequences of
Multiple Bail Conditions” (2011) 53 Canadian Journal of Criminology and
Criminal Justice 4;
Jane B. Sprott and Allan Manson, “ YCJA Bail Conditions: “Treating” Girls and Boys
Differently” (2017) 22 Canadian Criminal Law Review 77;
Martin L. Friedland, “The Bail Reform Act Revisited” (2012) 16 Canadian Criminal
Law Review 315;
Nicholas Bala, “Changing Professional Culture and Reducing Use of Courts and
Custody for Youth: The Youth Criminal Justice Act and Bill C-10” (2015) 78
Saskatchewan Law Review 127 – 180; and
The John Howard Society, “Reasonable Bail?” (2013) The Centre of Research, Policy
and Program Development.
10

appears to be “as old as the law of England itself... explicitly recognized by our
earliest writers”.35 Justice Trotter, a Jurist of the Court of Appeal of Ontario
considered to be the leading authority on bail, writes about bail being the result of
the inability to keep detainees alive and the frequency of escapees in 12th and 13th
century England,36 as opposed to “any love of an abstract liberty”.37 This led to a
system much like that still seen today in the United States,38 where family or friends
secure the release of the accused into their care by putting up some form of a
financial assurance.39 During this earliest-documented phase of bail in England, the
process was already being criticized for being ill-defined, for the sheriffs in charge of
detainees having discretion that was too wide-ranging, and for corruption amongst
the sheriffs which allowed for bribes.40
From 1275 onwards, for roughly 550 years, bail was dealt with under the Statute of
Westminster, I.41 This Act formalized the process to bring definition and order to the
proceedings, and created “bailable” and “non-bailable” offence categories.42 If the
offence was bailable, subject to a sufficient surety, the sheriff would have to release
the accused person. Justice Trotter discussed the categorization of offences as
seemingly being influenced by “the seriousness of the offence; the likelihood of the

Sir J.F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. 1 (New York: Burt
Franklin, 1883) at 233.
36 Gary T. Trotter, The Law of Bail in Canada, 3d ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters
Canada, 2018) at 1-3.
37 F. Pollock and F. Maitland, The History of the English Law, Vol. 2. (Cambridge:
University Press, 1953) at 584.
38 This is not to say that cash deposits are not still seen in Canada. In certain
situations, a cash deposit may be required to secure release of the accused. See s.
515(2)(d) & (e) of the Criminal Code. However, this system has largely been
replaced with pledges of money instead, either from the accused, or from their
surety. Conversely, money deposits are still a prevalent form of bail in most states in
the United States, and are criticized and written about extensively by American
theorists.
39 Supra, note 36 at 1-3.
40 Ibid.
41 Statute of Westminster, I, 1275 (UK), 3 Edw 1, c 15.
42 Supra, note 36 at 1-4.
35
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accused’s guilt; and the ‘outlawed’ status of the accused.”43 The main bail concern
during this period of time was the continued abuse of the system by sheriffs due to
their discretion in determining the suitability of a proposed surety.44 This led to the
powers of bail being transferred to justices who were seen to be more objective and
better versed in the law.45
1826 to 1848 saw a gradual shift in the concerns set out in the legislation when
considering the question of bail. First, the Criminal Justice Act, 182646 eradicated the
distinction between bailable and non-bailable offences. This allowed for bail to be
sought on all charges. Then, England’s Parliament amended and extended the
provisions of this act to create a new statute47 which articulated the main concern
for bail as being the attendance in court of the accused.48 Further emphasis on
attendance at court as the main bail consideration was seen with the introduction of
the Indictable Offences Act, 1848.49 This act sought sufficient sureties to ensure
attendance. This shift meant that the 19th century bail laws of England became
“solely concerned with ensuring the accused attended in court for trial… Other
criteria for release developed much later.”50

2.1.ii The Canadian System
Pre-Confederation, we borrowed the English system of bail51 where bail was a right
with respect to misdemeanors, but discretionary for felony offences. 52 With
Ibid.
Ibid, at 1-5.
45 Ibid; supra, note 31 at 243; Civil Procedure Act, 1330 (UK), 4 Edw. 3, c.1; Justices of
the Peace Act, 1361 (UK), 34 Edw. 3, c.1.
46 Criminal Justice Act, 1826, 1826 (UK), 7 Geo. 4, c. 64.
47 Criminal Justice Act, 1826, 1835 (UK), 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 33.
48 Supra, note 36 at 1-5.
49 Indictable Offences Act, 1848, 1848 (UK), 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42.
50 Supra, note 36 at 1-6.
51 M. Phelps, “The Legal Basis of the Right to Bail” (1970-71), 4 Man. L.J. 143 at 144;
and P.K. McWilliams “The Law of Bail” (1966-67), 9 CLQ 21 at 23.
52 In present day Canada, misdemeanors and felonies are no longer the terms used
to distinguish between offences. A distinction now is made between summary

43
44
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legislation titled An Act Respecting the Duties of Justices of the Peace, Out of Sessions,
in Relation to Persons Charged with Indictable Offences,53 bail was changed in 1869
and made discretionary for all offences. It allowed for discretion from the justice or
judge, and persisted for over 100 years.54
The early considerations in Canadian bail law were also focused on the accused’s
attendance in court.55 To make this decision, factors like seriousness of the offence,
severity of the penalty, strength of the evidence, and the accused’s standing in the
community were all considered.56 The other grounds for detention were not
enumerated until the English case of R. v Phillips influenced the Canadian system. 57
In Phillips, the court criticized his pre-trial release in coming to their decision about
the appropriateness of his sentence. They were concerned with the fact that he
committed a number of offences while on bail, and highlighted that “housebreaking”
was a crime likely to be repeated while on bail, especially by someone with a record
of committing this crime.58 They wrote:
“To turn such a man loose on society until he had received his punishment
for an undoubted offence, an offence which was not in dispute, was, in the
view of the Court, a very inadvisable step. They wish the magistrates who
release on bail young housebreakers, such as the applicant, to know that in
nineteen cases out of twenty it is a mistake.”59
There were two factors in Phillips that require special consideration – the
seriousness of the crime, and the strong evidence against the accused. Yet, despite

offences, and indictable offences. The original terms of misdemeanor and felonies
are still used in the United States, however England no longer uses them either: see
Criminal Law Act, 1967, 1967 c. 58.
53 An Act Respecting the Duties of Justices of the Peace, Out of Sessions, in Relation to
Persons Charged with Indictable Offences, SC 1869, c 30.
54 Supra, note 36 at 1-7.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 R. v Phillips (1947), 32 CR App Rep 47 (CCA) [Phillips].
58 Ibid, ¶ 48.
59 Ibid, ¶ 49.
13

its distinguishable features, Justice Trotter argues that the impact of this decision
has outgrown the intended purpose.
The impact of Phillips was felt in Canada, where Crowns began relying on the
English example to seek detention of accused persons to prevent the commission of
further offences. In R. v Samuelson,60 a case involving breaking and entering by
accused persons with records for similar offences, our courts – at least at first –
disagreed with Phillips. Samuelson saw this type of detention as preventative, a
concept that was without authority, and therefore “disturbing”.61
Eventually, the Canadian courts accepted the “preventative” approach in various
cases, including assault causing bodily harm,62 theft,63 and non-capital murder.64
Despite the early criticism of Phillips by Canadian jurists, the additional ground of
detention known as “prevention” became part of the legislation.65
By the 1960’s, research was being conducted that showed the bail system to be
fraught with difficulties, including a major concern that many accused were
suffering unnecessarily in pre-trial detention.66 Professor Martin Friedland was
particularly critical of the current system, and completed an empirical study of the
bail procedures in the Toronto Magistrates’ Court.67 His primary concerns were that
attendance of accused persons could be secured by less intrusive means,68 and a
concern that it was unfair to require security in advance as a condition precedent to

R. v Samuelson (1953), 109 CCC 253 (Nfld TD).
Ibid, at 256.
62 R. v Travers (1963) 42 CR 21 (Que QB).
63 R. v Lagus (1964) 42 CR 288 (Sask QB).
64 R. v Moses, [1969] 4 CCC 307 (NWT Terr Ct).
65 Supra, note 36 at 1-10.
66 Daniel Kiselbach, “Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure: Preventative Detention and the
Presumption of Innocence” (1988) 31 CLQ 168 at 2.
67 M.L. Friedland, Detention Before Trial: A Study of Cases Tried in the Toronto
Magistrates’ Courts (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).
68 Ibid, at 43-44.

60

61
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release.69 Most concerning was the “disturbing relationship” he found between pretrial detention and the outcome of trial. As Justice Trotter summarized it:
“…[Professor Friedland’s] study found that a detained accused was more
likely than his or her bailed counterpart to be convicted of the offence
charged. Furthermore, a detained person was more likely to receive a
custodial sentence. Simply put, accused persons who were denied bail received
more jail, more often.” (emphasis is mine)
Soon after Professor Friedland’s research, a report was created by the Canadian
Committee on Corrections, 70 calling for a reduction in judicial discretion on
decisions of bail. Recommendations were also being offered by the Royal
Commission following their criticisms contained in their report. 71 These
recommendations were accepted and included in the Criminal Code,72 as the result
of Bill (C-218) which came into force in 1972 as the Bail Reform Act.73
The Bail Reform Act was seen as a complete overhaul and codification of the law of
bail.74 In keeping with the recommendations of the Royal Commission and the
Canadian Committee on Corrections, a number of changes were made. Powers were
given to police to release, avoiding unnecessary arrest and detention.75 Cash
deposits were restricted in use.76 Following the case law precedent first seen in
Phillips, a “secondary ground” was enumerated, allowing for detention in the public
interest and to prevent further offending.77 The onus of justifying detention was

Ibid, at 110.
C.M. Powell, “Arrest and Judicial Interim Release” in Addresses Delivered at
Seminar by the Canadian Bar Association at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel, August 26,
1972 (Toronto: Canada Law Book Ltd., 1973) at 45.
71 Royal Commission (Ontario), Inquiry into Civil Rights (1968), Vol. 2 (Chief Justice
McRuer, Commissioner).
72 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34: now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46
73 Bail Reform Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 37 [the “Bail Reform Act”].
74 Supra, note 36 at 1-12.
75 Supra, note 73 section 449-456.
76 Ibid, section 457(2)(d).
77 Ibid, section 457(7).
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placed on the prosecutor.78 Further, procedures were codified for the process of bail
hearings,79 bail reviews,80 and bail pending appeal.81 An amended version of the Bail
Reform Act came about four years later,82 shifting the onus of proof regarding
release onto the accused in a number of situations,83 and also expanding the scope
of the secondary ground.84
The Bail Reform Act has largely remained the law on bail in Canada, with some
exception. One exception comes from the amendments made to offer courts a “menu
of conditions… [which] has made it more difficult to obtain bail and has resulted in
more stringent release orders.”85 This trend is said to have followed the anti-gang
amendments to the Criminal Code, as well as the legislation that followed the events
of September 11, 2001.86 The “tough on crime” trend in these amendments has
arguably eroded the presumption of condition-less bail, initially sparked by the Bail
Reform Act in the 1970’s.87
In terms of legislation, two further pieces should be considered. First, the Canadian
Bill of Rights88 specifically addresses bail in section 2(f) and calls for both the right
to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, and the right to “reasonable bail
without just cause”.89 Despite being legislation that still remains in force, the Bill of
Rights does not get a lot of exercise in the courts. This is because of the second
remaining legislation that deserves recognition, and perhaps the most litigated: the

Ibid, section 457(1).
Ibid, section 457.2 and 457.3.
80 Ibid, section 457.5, 457.6, and 680.
81 Ibid, section 679.
82 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1975, SC 1974-75-76, c 93.
83 Ibid, section 457(5.1).
84 Ibid, section 457(7)(b).
85 Supra, note 36 1-13.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid, at 1-14.
88 Canadian Bill of Rights S.C. 1960, c. 44
89 Ibid, section 2(f).
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.90 Because of the Charter, courts have held
that it would be inappropriate to reassess or re-interpret the Bill of Rights.91
The Charter explicitly protects the right to bail in section 11(e):
“s. 11 Any person charged with an offence has the right…
…(e) not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause.”92
Despite its express promise, the Charter was initially approached with caution as it
related to bail because of the heavy lifting thought to have been done already by the
Bail Reform Act.93 By the early 1990’s, however, the courts were beginning to
acknowledge the potential for continuing reform that the Charter could offer.
In a group of cases out of Quebec,94 courts were beginning to hear and apply Charter
considerations with more interest. One of these cases was taken to the Supreme
Court of Canada, R. v Morales,95 which in combination with R. v Pearson,96 gave the
Court its first opportunity to consider section 11(e). Led by Chief Justice Lamer, the
Court provided a framework for the consideration of bail and the Charter. His
decision focused on the presumption of innocence as the most important feature of
section 11(e). The Court was required to consider this presumption against the
backdrop of the facts of Pearson, where the accused was being detained pursuant to
a reverse-onus provision of the Criminal Code, section 515(6)(d). Reverse-onus
provisions shift the onus of showing cause why bail is justified to the accused, as
Charter, supra note 22.
R. v Cornell (1988), 40 CCC (3d) 385 (SCC) at 391-392; R. v Beauregard (1986), 30
DLR (4th) 481 (SCC) at 506; and R. v Lauzon (1992), 73 CCC (3d) 52 (Ont CA) at 5859.
92 Charter, supra note 22 section 11(e).
93 Supra, note 36 at 1-18.
94 R. v Lamothe (1990), 58 CCC (3d) 530 (Que CA); R. v Gervais (1988) 42 CCC (3d)
352 (Que SC); R. v Perron (1989), 51 CCC (3d) 518 (Que CA); R. v Morales (February
1, 1991), (Que SC) [unreported].
95 R. v Morales (1992), 17 CR (4th) 74 (SCC) [Morales].
96 R. v Pearson (1992), 17 CR (4th) 1 (SCC) [Pearson].
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opposed to requiring the Crown to show cause why bail is not justified. In Pearson,
the majority held that the effect of section 515(6)(d) was to dilute the basic
entitlement to bail. They found the same applied to section 515(6)(a) in Morales.97
Two considerations were delineated in Pearson:98 that the restriction on the basic
entitlement to bail is permissible if two conditions are present. Firs, bail must only
be denied in a narrow set of circumstances. Second, the denial of bail must be
necessary to promote the proper functioning of the bail system, and is not
undertaken for any purpose extraneous to the bail system. Applying this to the
reverse onus provisions, it was held that they did not infringe section 11(e), as the
effect of the provision was to “…establish a set of special bail rules in circumstances
where the normal bail process is incapable of functioning properly.”99
Of interest is the minority decision in Pearson, written by Justice McLachlin (as she
then was). Her decision was concurred with by Justice La Forest. The facts of
Pearson had the Court considering reverse-onus provisions relating to the charge of
drug trafficking. Justice McLachlin dissented, finding that the provision was overbroad as it captured both large-scale traffickers, and small-time dealers alike.100
Because of its overbreadth, she found it was not saved by section 1.101 This
dissenting opinion is of particular note because nearly thirty years later, reverse
onus provisions are still contained in the Criminal Code today, despite the passage of
time, continued opposition to these provisions, and opportunity for others to relitigate the issue.102
The second case we noted, Morales, was significant for its own reasons. The Court
had to consider the provision under section 515(10)(b) of the Criminal Code, which
Morales, supra note 95 at 103.
Pearson, supra note 96 ¶ 60.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid, ¶ 68-72.
101 Ibid, ¶ 72.
102 There have been some legislated amendments to these provisions: see SC 1997, c
18.
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allows for pre-trial detention that is contrary to the “public interest” because of a
concern that the accused may commit further offences while on bail. This idea of
detention in the public interest, often referred to as preventative detention, is one
that will play a significant role in our discussions relating to the intersection of
mental health and bail. Therefore, a review of Morales and the path that
preventative bail has taken is warranted.

2.1.iii Detention Necessary in the Public Interest
Morales required the Court to employ the two-factor test from Pearson in
determining whether section 515(10)(b), and the ability to detain in the “public
interest”, was constitutional. The Court in Morales considered 11(e) as it related to
the use of the term “public interest” in section 515(10)(b). While the Court split on
this analysis, Chief Justice Lamer for the majority ruled that it was impermissibly
vague, and could not be saved by Section 1. As such, the Court severed the words “or
in the public interest” from the section, and declined to strike down the entire
paragraph.103
The Court was unanimous in agreeing that the section was otherwise constitutional,
as it engaged the “just cause” component of section 11(e) of the Charter. In
considering the first factor in Pearson, the Court found that section 515(10)(b) only
allowed bail to be denied in specific circumstances because of the requirement of
there being a “substantial likelihood” of the accused committing an offence.104
Perhaps more surprisingly, in their analysis of the second Pearson factor, the Court
found that the rule was consistent with the objectives of the bail system as it focused
on preventing pre-trial criminal conduct.105 This was thought by many to be
unsettling, as “[t]he Court was not troubled by the fragility of predictions of further
criminality…”.106
Morales, supra note 95 at 102-103.
Ibid, at 98.
105 Ibid, at 99.
106 Supra, note 36 at 1-23.
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Five years after Morales, Parliament amended section 515(10) in 1997 in such a way
that it had the effect of reintroducing “the public interest” ground for detention.107
Instead of re-adding it to the secondary ground, Parliament gave it its own ground,
which has since become known as the “tertiary ground” for detention.108 At the
time, the section read as follows:
s. 515(10) For the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused is
justified only on one or more of the following grounds…
… (c) on any other just cause being shown and without limiting the
generality of the foregoing where the detention is necessary in order
to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard
to all of the circumstances, including the apparent strength of the
prosecution’s case, the gravity of the nature of the offence, the
circumstances surrounding its commission and the potential for a
lengthy term of imprisonment.
This new ground for detention provided for renewed litigation of the concept of
“public interest”, and made its way back to the Supreme Court of Canada again in R.
v Hall.109
Hall was about a man charged with the second degree murder of a relative. The
victim was stabbed 37 times, and there were signs of attempted decapitation. He
was detained following a show cause hearing on the basis of the tertiary ground
found in section 515(10)(c). In coming to this conclusion, the bail Judge considered
the brutality of the crime, the strength of the evidence against Hall, and the fear in
the community, coming mostly from the victim’s family.110

Criminal Law Improvement Act, 1996, SC 1997, c 18, s 59.
The “primary ground” is found in section 515(10)(a), and considers whether the
accused will appear for court. The “secondary ground” is found in section
515(10)(b), which considers whether there is a substantial likelihood of the accused
reoffending. Thus, section 515(10)(c) is referred to as the “tertiary ground”.
109 R. v. Hall (2002), 167 CCC (3d) 449 (SCC) [Hall].
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The Supreme Court of Canada’s consideration of Hall required them to look at this
new provision to determine whether it withheld Pearson scrutiny. The majority, led
by Chief Justice McLachlin, held that certain phrases within the provision were
invalid, but the remainder was constitutional. Specifically, they invalidated the
phrase “any other just cause”, as it was seen to confer an open-ended judicial
discretion to refuse bail, and as such was unconstitutional.111 The phrase “without
limiting the generality of the foregoing” was also found to be unconstitutional, and
severed this too from the rest of the section. The remaining wording was allowed to
stand on its own.112 Justice McLachlin was careful to point out that section
515(10)(c) was not a “catch-all” for cases where the primary and secondary
grounds had failed. She found it to be its own distinct ground.113 The majority
decision in Hall gave the impression that the Supreme Court was moving towards a
less liberty-friendly approach to bail.
Justice Iacobucci dissented vigorously, and would have struck down the entire
provision. His position was that the heart of a free and democratic society included
the right to the bail, thus respecting the presumption of innocence. He did not agree
that the tertiary ground respected these basic concepts. In his dissent, he quoted
from the large body of empirical work that confirmed the disturbing relationship
between pre-trial detention and conviction that we have previously discussed.114
Justice Iacobucci found that both Pearson factors were not satisfied by the new
provision. He pointed out that the previous five years since the Court had struck
down the “public interest” portion of section 515(10)(b) had not seen any new
indications that the current bail system was inadequate.115 In addition to Justice
Iacobucci’s disagreement with the majority decision, Hall has also been criticized
harshly by academic commentators, with Professor Don Stuart going as far as to call
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it “deeply disappointing”. 116 Concerns were raised that it would cause a
disproportionate impact on visible minorities and the poor. This is because the
broad wording allowed for racist and discriminatory views to be hidden under the
language of a tertiary ground detention order, despite the majority’s finding that the
section was not overly broad.117 In other words, there is great concern among many
in the legal community that the Supreme Court got it wrong in Hall. Arguably, the
impact of the tertiary ground’s impact has also been felt by mentally ill accused
resulting from arbitrary detention for mental health concerns disguised as public
interest. As we will explore later, the answer to these concerns can be remedied
without the need for detention.
Section 515(10)(c) has since been revisited once more in R. v St-Cloud.118 Here, the
Supreme Court of Canada clarified aspects of its previous ruling in Hall. Notably,
they explained that “detention may be justified only in rare cases” did not mean a
bail court must make a finding that the case before them is “rare” in order to detain
on the tertiary ground. Instead, St. Cloud explained the reference to “rare” as a
consequence of the application of section 515(10)(c) itself, meaning very few cases
should or would have a tertiary ground detention component. It is likely that this is
a distinction without a difference.
The evolution of our bail grounds has allowed for “preventative” detention. This
concept of preventative detention has been explored by many theorists. It is a
problematic concept, one which we will explore below. Its impact in cases involving
mentally ill persons is also concerning. This is because mentally ill persons are more
likely to be seen by bail courts as unreliable and unpredictable, which leads to
arguments often being made by Crown Attorneys that the accused should be

Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell,
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detained for preventative reasons under the secondary and sometimes tertiary
grounds.119 As such, we turn now to a discussion of preventative detention.

2.2 Preventing Future Crime through Pre-Trial Detention
In the days since the Bail Reform Act, there are certainly positive advances that have
been made to our bail system. As just one obvious example, Canada does not suffer
from the discriminatory and harshly criticized money bail system seen in many
states in the United States.120 Cash deposits for bail have been studied extensively
there, and have been shown to disproportionately affect the poor, and racialized
minorities.121 We also no longer suffer from the broad discretion of courts at the bail
level that was allowed under the former system, which lacked a mechanism to
review those decisions. The right to review a bail decision has now been a
consistent right of accused persons, and ensures that bail courts are held
accountable for their decisions in a way that requires reasoned principles for
detention.
Canada’s current bail system is not worthy of all praise though. In fact, despite the
efforts and good intentions of the Bail Reform Act, our bail system remains
significantly challenged, criticized, and in need of repair. It has been described by
many in negative terms, such as “broken”, “failing” and “inequitable”.122 There

The unreliability of some mentally ill persons is also referenced by Crown
Attorneys in bail court to try and secure detention under the primary ground.
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remains consistent call for reform to our current bail system, with many critics
viewing risk aversion as an ongoing plague in our system.123 The main complaint of
many of these critics is this concept of preventative justice, the idea of bail being
denied because of the speculative fear that they may commit future offences.
Preventative justice means that legally innocent persons are at risk of being held in
custody. The idea of preventative justice has been widely studied. Those who are
advocates for this kind of justice argue that specific complainants or victims, and
society in general, are better off when an accused is incapacitated such that they
cannot commit further offences.124 Problems with this argument include that not all
accused are charged with violent crime, and that at the bail stage, the state has not
yet proven they are even guilty of anything.
These concerns become even more intensified when one remembers that the
standard for proof of a crime is only “beyond a reasonable doubt”. Because our
John Howard Society of Ontario, Reasonable Bail?, (Toronto, 2013);
Department of Justice Canada, "Broken Bail" in Canada: How We Might Go About
Fixing It, (Ottawa, 2015);
Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Bail and Remand in Ontario, Raymond
Wyant auth. (Toronto, 2016);
Canadian Civil Liberties Association and Education Trust, Set up to Fail: Bail and the
Revolving Door of Pre-Trial Detention, (2014);
Martin L. Friedland, "The Bail Reform Act Revisited" (2012) 16:3 Can. Crim. L. Rev.
315;
Legal Aid Ontario, A Legal Aid Strategy for Bail, (Toronto, 2016);
Nicole Myers, "Shifting Risk: Bail and the Use of Sureties" (2009) 21:1 Current
Issues in Crim. J. 127;
Benjamin L. Berger & James Stribopoulos, "Risk and the Role of the Judge: Lessons
from Bail", in Benjamin Berger, Emma Cunliffe & James Stribopoulos eds., To
Ensure that Justice is Done: Essays in Memory of Marc Rosenberg (Toronto:
Thompson Reuters, 2017).
123 Cheryl Marie Webster, Anthony N. Doob, and Nicole M. Myers, "The Parable of
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standard of proof is not one of certainty, people will find themselves convicted of
crimes who have not necessarily committed one. The standard is even less exacting
at the bail stage, and thus, more problematic as it relates to detaining legally, and
potentially factually, innocent persons. As RA Duff has written, “…pre-trial remand is
pre-emptive rather than defensive; it coerces a defendant before he has the chance
to decide whether to abscond or otherwise offend.”125 These kinds of speculative
detentions should not be allowed.
Preventing future crime is a laudable goal. Most people agree that crime is not
something we want in our community. The real challenge, though, comes from
knowing how to prevent it, since most of us do not have the ability to predict the
future. Bail judges, sadly, are not immune to this shortcoming. Innocent persons
become entangled in the system despite their innocence. For those who are in fact
guilty of their charges, the system is doing little to address the root cause of their
criminality. In cases of mentally ill offenders, this becomes increasingly challenging.
Whether it is a personality disorder, mood disorder, or addiction disorder, mental
health is precarious, making it difficult to predict. When courts are asked to assess
the likelihood of future criminality in the case of a mentally ill accused, they are
often being asked to determine whether someone is releasable while knowing very
little information about their disorder - if it has even been diagnosed at all. They are
asked whether a plan can be fashioned that is strong enough to safe-guard from the
chances of the person continuing their alleged criminality. To add to the difficulties,
they are asked to do all of this without the power or authority to order any further
assessments or treatment for the accused – even where the accused is sometimes
begging for help and would consent to such an order.
Let us return to the primary ground for a moment. We must also remember that bail
courts are concerned about the ability of an accused person to get back to court for
RA Duff, “Pre-Trial Detention and the Presumption of Innocence” in Andrea
Ashworth et al, eds, Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013) 115 at 119.
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their appearances. In this way, knowing more about their illness is also helpful to
satisfy the primary grounds. For example, if the person has challenges with
remembering dates on account of their mental disorder, then the Court will want to
be assured that there is some way they will remember their future court date.
Perhaps keeping a calendar is the simple answer, or if the person has a support
worker in the community, the concern can be mitigated. The primary ground
concerns are undoubtedly affected by the mental health of the accused person
before the court. Arguably, though, the risk of re-offending is where most bail
courts will be concerned as it relates to mentally ill accused persons, and so
understanding the context in which we currently view preventative detention is
helpful.

2.2.i The Presumption of Innocence is Not Absolute
Situations other than bail considerations have required our courts to consider the
liberty interests of Canadian citizens. For example, in the context of mandatory jail
sentences for absolute liability offences, the Supreme Court of Canada found in
Reference Re: BC Motor Vehicle Act126 that individual rights had to be considered
against the claim for the greater good.127 The Court held:
“It has from time immemorial been part of our system of laws that the innocent
not be punished. This principle has long been recognized as an essential element
of a system for the administration of justice which is founded upon a belief in the
dignity and worth of the human person and on the rule of law.”
Through protection of individual rights, this decision ensured the greater good.128
Scholars, like Professor Martin Friedland, have also provided insight into the
importance of liberty, stating that "the law should abhor any unnecessary
deprivation of liberty and positive steps should be taken to ensure that detention
before trial is kept to a minimum.129
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In the context of bail rights, courts are constantly reminded of the presumption of
innocence as the backdrop for their decision. The right to be secure from detention
prior to conviction is concentrated on the accused’s status as a legally innocent
person.130 Legal innocence must be kept squarely in focus. The person may well be
guilty of the offence, but the court must still treat them as if they are innocent when
determining bail – and for good reason. The research is clear about the real impact
that pre-trial detention can have on an accused person, including loss of their job,
stigmatization, an inability to prepare their case, and also a troubling incentive to
plead guilty instead of waiting for trial.131 Jocelyn Simonson has written that
“[s]tudies have shown time and time again that pretrial detention increases the
chances of a conviction, extends the probable length of a sentence, and decreases
the chance that the charges will be dismissed altogether.”132 The presumption of
innocence must therefore be central to the question of bail so to avoid the damaging
consequences of pre-trial detention in the event the accused is actually innocent.
The United States has also struggled with this issue, seen predominantly in the case
of United States v Salerno.133 Dealing with a less-than sympathetic accused person,
the court was required to determine whether Mr. Salerno – an alleged New York
mafia boss – should be granted bail. In a split decision, the minority held that pretrial detention for a “preventative” purpose was punitive, and that it violated due
process. They felt that preventative detention, as a justification to deny bail, lost
sight of the fact that a charge is only evidence that the person will be tried – not that
they have done anything criminal, or as evidence of their likelihood to do something
criminal again if released.134 The majority, however, justified preventative detention
as a regulatory necessity, not as a punitive function. They focused on crime
Ibid.
Ibid, at 16; see also Christopher Sherrin, “Excessive Pre-Trial Incarceration”
(2012) 75 Saskatchewan Law Review 55-96 at 1; and Jocelyn Simonson, “Bail
Nullification” (2017) 115 Michigan Law Review at 585 and 589.
132 Simonson, ibid at 589.
133 United States v Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987) [Salerno].
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prevention as a legitimate aim of the law, and thus allowed detention to continue
occurring on this ground. The majority may have erroneously concentrated on the
particular background of this accused, Mr. Salerno. It is an interesting question to
posit whether their decision would have been the same were the accused person a
more palatable individual. The result, regardless of the characteristics of Mr. Salerno
himself, was the ongoing pervasiveness of a culture of risk-aversion and crime
prevention now being applied to all accused persons – even those who were far
from being a mafia boss.
Salerno was decided in 1987, at a time when the Canadian courts had not yet been
required to consider the issue as it related to our own similar ground for detention.
Despite the acknowledgment by the Supreme Court of Canada that the U.S
Constitution and the Charter are materially different at times,135 it is interesting to
realize that Canada has continued to uphold the secondary ground - a ground for
detention very similar to that considered in the United States.
It was shortly after Salerno, in 1992, that Canada saw the secondary ground come
under scrutiny in the Morales136 case that we have already explored. Under section
515(10)(b),137 detention is allowed if the accused poses a substantial likelihood of
committing a new offence. The purpose of the secondary ground, like the ground
under which Salerno was detained in the American context, is to disallow the release
of an accused out of fear that they will commit another crime – even if that crime is
simply breaching the court’s bail order.
The secondary ground has led to a watering down of the presumption of innocence.
This dilution of the presumption of innocence is the position that is advanced by the
minority in Salerno. Because at least some Justices in the United States Supreme
Court could see this argument, it is surprising that not even one Supreme Court of
R. v. Smith (1987), 34 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 141.
Morales, supra note 95.
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Canada Justice dissented on the constitutionality of the tertiary ground provision
after removal of the words “in the public interest” in Morales. Instead, all of the
Justices of the Canadian court agreed that it was a legitimate aim of the legislature to
prevent crime - much like the majority found in Salerno. In the end, it has left the
provincial bail courts with an unenviable task: how to determine when one is
“substantially likely” to reoffend.
As alluded to earlier, this task is difficult because of the problems associated with
predicting future criminal activity. In the context of mentally ill persons, it has been
said that “[m]ental health professionals erroneously predict dangerousness up to
95% of the time. Judges are unlikely to be better predictors.”138 In R. v Lyons,139 the
court recognized that psychiatric evidence can be notoriously inaccurate in its
attempt to forecast future violent behavior. The Court in Morales was confronted
with the argument that it is difficult to predict future behavior, but still did not find
the secondary ground resultantly problematic. They held that “the impossibility of
making exact predictions does not preclude a bail system which aims to deny bail to
those who will likely be dangerous.”140 Instead, they contented themselves with the
review provisions provided in the bail process for those who are ordered detained.

2.2.ii Is Substantial Likelihood Measurable?
So then, how do we measure “substantial likelihood” under the secondary ground?
Not surprisingly, the Courts struggled with this in early days. They defined the term
by substituting other words like “real” likelihood.141 They have revisited the
question several times, including a recent pronouncement in R. v Young142 in 2010
that:
“…the likelihood of a particular risk materializing cannot be looked at in the
abstract. Rather, it must be weighed against the gravity of the harm that will
Supra, note 66 at 8.
R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 SCR 309 at 99.
140 Morales, supra note 95 at 108.
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ensue if the risk comes to pass. For example, even a very grave risk that an
incorrigible petty thief will shoplift again if granted bail is one that the court
might be willing to take when balanced against the accused’s constitutional
right to reasonable bail. On the other hand, where the anticipated harm is
very grave, a more remote risk may be sufficient to meet the test of
substantial likelihood.”143
Justice Trotter points out that a standard that is too low will fail to satisfy the “just
cause” requirement under the Charter that bail can only be denied in a narrow set of
circumstances. If the standard is held too high, it would undermine the finding by
the Supreme Court of Canada that our inability to predict future behavior is not an
issue to worry ourselves about. Instead, he suggests the proper and accepted
approach to be the “enhanced balance of probabilities standard”.144

2.2.iii Making Bail: A Laddered Approach
Despite the fact that the three grounds of detention have been in existence in their
current format for years now, our courts continue to struggle with this at a very
practical level. The concept of reasonable bail may seem straight-forward when
discussed in the abstract, but it becomes complicated in application to a real-life
accused person standing before the court. This is because every accused person will
present with unique challenges, different backgrounds, varied charges, and differing
abilities to put together a bail plan. The variables are endless, and therefore, each
bail decision is a fact-driven inquiry.
To assist with this exercise, there are different levels of bail plans available to
accused persons. The levels, often referred to as “rungs on a ladder”,145 become
increasingly onerous. This is in keeping with section 515(3), which requires the
court to release the accused person on the least onerous form of release unless the
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Crown can show why that should not be the case.146 Starting with a Summons to
appear, issued without conditions by police, all the way up to a residential surety
bail with house arrest requirements, the different levels of liberty afforded to
accused persons can vary greatly. This variation allows courts to have the flexibility
needed to fashion bail terms that address the three potential grounds of bail
concerns. The following diagram is illustrative of these increasingly onerous rungs:

From time to time, it seems bail courts need a reminder that bail terms are to be the
least onerous necessary to meet the concerns raised by either of the three grounds.
Most recently, these reminders have come in the cases of R. v Antic147 from the
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Ibid, ¶ 4.
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Supreme Court of Canada in 2017, and R. v Tunney148 from the Superior Court of
Ontario in 2018.
In Antic, the Court dealt with an accused charged with drug and gun offences, who
had been denied bail. Because he was resident in Ontario, and within 200 kilometers
of the court that had jurisdiction of his charges, he was not able to put down a cash
deposit to help secure his bail by virtue of section 515(2)(e). The bail court had held
that if a cash deposit and a surety recognizance were available, Mr. Antic would
otherwise have been releasable. In the lower appeal courts, he was able to
successfully argue that section 515(2)(e) was unconstitutional as it denied him bail
when it would otherwise be available to others who met the geographical
conditions. The Supreme Court of Canada held, instead, that they did not need to
consider the constitutionality of section 515(2)(e), as the error came from the bail
court misapplying the bail provisions. The Court reminded us that a surety
Recognizance with a monetary pledge is one of the highest forms of release, which
was one version of the plan offered to the bail court in Mr. Antic’s case. As such, bail
was appropriate in his circumstances without the need to deposit the money. Antic
reminded us of two important principles: first, that requiring cash deposits creates
unfairness;149 and second, that the ladder principle must be applied consistently
across Canada, emphasizing again the need for bail courts to always consider the
least onerous terms necessary.150
Less than a year after Antic, Tunney was released by Justice DiLuca. It seemed that,
yet again, bail courts were having to be reminded that bail is to be granted on the
least onerous terms possible unless the Crown can show cause otherwise. In a wellresearched and persuasive decision, Justice DiLuca pointed out that there was an
over-reliance on sureties, likening surety bail to the requirement of cash deposits as
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the new way of holding persons in custody.151 Quoting from Professor Friedland,
Justice DiLuca criticized the culture of nearly automatic reliance on sureties:
“The present system is, however, not working well in Ontario. The pendulum
has swung too far in the direction of requiring sureties rather than using
release on one's own recognizance. In England, sureties are required in only
a small fraction of the cases. About two thirds of those who appear for a bail
hearing in Toronto today are required to find sureties and only about half of
this number are actually released. The other half, it appears, could not find
acceptable sureties. Less than 10% held for a bail hearing are released on
their own undertaking or recognizance.”152
If we continue to properly employ the laddered approach to bail, then it is possible
our system may come under less criticism. It has been said that the ladder principle
strikes a balance between the competing interests of public safety and the
presumption of innocence. For example, Benjamin Berger and James Stribopolous
have written:
“In the criminal justice context, adopting a precautionary approach to risk
management can lead to a relinquishment of the burdens of judgment and
the responsibility to vindicate important legal values and principles. As the
Supreme Court has underscored in Antic, the guiding concept in bail -- the
one that gives effect to the fundamental values of the system, including the
presumption of innocence -- is not the precautionary principle, but the ladder
principle.” 153
These rungs have helped courts analyze and respond to the several considerations
at play during a bail hearing. However, a bail plan is only as successful as the
amount of information given to the court about the accused and the allegations.
Thus, understanding the specific and individualized factors for each accused that a
court has to account for is an important exercise.

Tunney, supra note 148 ¶ 30. See also Martin L. Friedland, “Criminal Justice in
Canada Revisited” (2004), 48 C.L.Q. 419 at 433-434.
152 Ibid, ¶ 30, quoting from Martin L. Friedland, “Criminal Justice in Canada
Revisited” (2004), 48 C.L.Q. 419 at 433.
153 Benjamin L. Berger & James Stribopoulos, "Risk and the Role of the Judge:
Lessons from Bail", in Benjamin Berger, Emma Cunliffe & James Stribopoulos eds.,
To Ensure that Justice is Done: Essays in Memory of Marc Rosenberg (Toronto:
Thompson Reuters, 2017).
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2.2.iv Some Considerations During a Bail Hearing
There are many factors a bail court has to consider. Often times the analysis
involves the potential penalty for an offence, or the strength of the evidence against
an accused person.154 For the purposes of this discussion, we will look at some of the
considerations most prevalent in cases with a mentally-ill accused person.
Perhaps most persuasive to a Crown’s argument for detention is proof of a criminal
record,155 especially one that is lengthy, recent, includes serious offences, and
offences that are similar to the charges currently before the court. Breaches of court
orders, especially previous bail conditions, are also heavily inspected, and can cause
a court to detain out of a belief that the accused will not be compliant with a
proposed plan of supervision and the conditions of release.
Another consideration is whether the accused is already on bail or on probation. If
they are, it signals to the court that the accused is less likely to follow terms placed
on them. By virtue of section 524(1) of the Criminal Code,156 an alleged breach of a
bail order shifts the onus to the accused for their subsequent bail hearing. The same
is true if the accused is thought to have committed a new or different indictable
offence while out on bail. This section was one of the reverse-onus provisions
considered in Morales, and like the reverse-onus applied to drug traffickers, was
upheld by the court as constitutional, since it operated only when the bail system
appeared not to be working properly.157
An oft-cited reason for detention on the secondary ground is the nature of the
alleged offence. For reasons that have not always been well explained or

Supra, note 36 at 3-4 – 3-8.
The Crown can lead evidence of a criminal record via section 518(1)(c)(i) of the
Criminal Code.
156 Supra, note 5 s. 524(1).
157 Morales, supra note 95.
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supported,158 courts have held that accused alleged to have committed certain
offences are seen to have a propensity for committing further offences. This logic
has been employed in drug trafficking cases,159 burglaries, 160 and domestic violence
cases.161 In the case of domestic charges, a “cycle of violence” is often present in the
relationships between accused and complainants. This relationship is further
complicated by the desire of some complainants to continue the relationship even
after the alleged criminal behavior, or because the sharing of children makes a clean
split from the accused person difficult. In domestic cases, a specific person is often
the subject of the safeguards implemented via the bail conditions, and only if
meaningful conditions can be met to protect that person, is bail seen as
appropriate.162
Considering the nature of the offence at the bail stage can also be helpful to an
accused person seeking bail. Courts have released accused where the effect of their
detention would be more punitive than the sentence they would receive if found
guilty of the offence.163 Like the “incorrigible petty thief” described by Justice Clarke
in Young,164 the courts have signaled that minor crimes should not be the concern of
most bail courts. Despite this, we still see a number of petty crimes bogging down
our bail courts.
A. Ashworth, The Criminal Process – An Evaluative Study, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998) at 215-216. The author points to statistical research that
demonstrates that the conclusion reached in Phillips, supra note 53 that burglars are
more likely to commit future burglaries is a “considerable exaggeration”.
159 R. v Groulx (1974), 17 CCC (2d) 351 (Que SC).
160 Phillips, supra note 57.
161 Examples of this proposition in domestic violence cases are endless. For just a
few examples, see R. v B.(F.F.)(1991), 275 APR 267 (NS CA); R. v E.(T.R.), 2011 ABQB
766; and R. v Hawryliuk, 2012 ONSC 867.
162 Supra, note 36 at 3-19. Domestic cases are often ripe for mental health
intervention, given the prevalence of mental health disorders amongst domestic
offenders. We will consider this further, below, when we discuss the types of
offences and offenders who could greatly benefit from early intervention of the
criminal justice system as it relates to their mental health needs.
163 R. v Walsh, (1984), 11 WCB 31 (Nfld SCTD).
164 Young, supra note 142.
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The ties one has to a community are often considered as well, where primary
ground considerations are at play. The theory here is that a person with “roots” to a
community is less likely to abscond from their criminal matter, as they would have
to walk away from a number of relationships or social attachments.165 Hundreds of
years of many accused persons returning to court to face their charges suggests that
these social connections are likely valid considerations for bail courts.
In the context of mentally ill accused, however, the problem with this consideration
becomes nearly immediate: mentally ill persons are less likely to have the kinds of
roots that a court might look for, like employment, a stable home, property
ownership, or a close group of friends or family members to call on for support. This
means that mentally ill persons are more likely to be detained under the primary
ground, as an indirect result of their mental illness.
A final consideration to help determine whether bail should be granted on the
secondary grounds is the stability of the accused person. The court will consider
whether drugs or alcohol were a factor in the allegations.166 If they were, some
evidence of the accused person dealing with the issue if it is an addiction would
assist. If, instead, the behavior was seen as a one-time issue for someone who does
not have addiction issues, that may also assist the court in releasing.
Stability is especially important in the context of our discussion of mentally ill
accused persons. As Justice Trotter rightfully points out, it is “inappropriate to
detain an accused because of a mental disorder or illness”. If the accused person
continues to pose a risk on account of their mental illness, and they refuse to
address the issue, some courts have seen detention as the only alternative.167 Dr.
Bloom and Justice Schneider have written about this issue, stating that “bailSupra, note 36 at 3-8.
Ibid.
167 R. v Rondeau (1996), 108 CCC (3d) 474 (Que CA).
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worthiness of a mentally disordered accused may depend on whether he has
sufficient psychiatric supervision in place”.168
Since an accused person’s stability is a consideration, one might hope to see
programs available to assist those persons in stabilizing themselves. Like preparing
for a trial, accessing community resources becomes infinitely more difficult for the
accused person who spends their entire day in custody. While some accused might
have already begun accessing these services before coming into custody, a greater
number of them will not have. Therefore, it seems common sense that our criminal
justice system would be interested in providing assistance or resources to those
who have not already made these connections.
Instead, we need to realize that our system is ill-equipped to help those struggling
with mental health issues. This is especially true during the pre-trial stages, like bail,
where guilt or innocence has not yet been adjudicated. Unless the person has been
found guilty and finds themselves at the sentencing stage, there are few
rehabilitative options available to the courts. An assessment for “not criminally
responsible on account of a mental disorder” is one such option, and an assessment
for “fitness” of the accused is another. These options are not used often, but offer
some options for the Courts to consider. Some other fixes exist as well, which we
will explore in turn. While getting help for a young person during the bail stage is
likely more promising than for an adult in the same position, there are still places
for improvement within our youth system. First, though, we turn to the intersection
of mental health and our criminal justice system from the lens of the adult accused
person.

Hy Bloom & Richard D. Schneider, Mental Disorder and the Law, (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2017) at 153.
168
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Part 3
The Problem: Adult Accused and
Mental Health Assessment Options
“Criminalization is another facet of the narrative of mental health and criminal
justice. Testimony before the Hyde Inquiry from front-line police officers and other
witnesses illuminated the fact that people having problems with their mental health
in the community often find themselves ‘drawn into the justice system.’ Witnesses
to the Inquiry made a direct link between the inadequacy of mental health services
in the community and through the health care system and the criminalization of
persons with mental illness.”169
-Justice Anne Derrick
This discussion is not the first to consider the overlap of mental health and criminal
justice, and it certainly will not be the last. The relationship between the two is so
long and storied, that like the laws on bail, properly documenting its history is likely
an impossible task. Instead, this discussion will consider a brief overview of the
history, only to the extent necessary to have a nuanced understanding of the current
options available to mentally ill accused persons. We will then look at those options,
limited as they are – including the “not criminally responsible for reason of mental
disorder” and “fitness” assessments, the impact on mens rea considerations, mental
health courts, and the potential application of the Mental Health Act.170

3.1 A Brief History of Mental Health and Criminal Justice
3.1.i The Lieutenant-Governor System
To understand this intersection, we again begin in England. In the 19th century,
following a murder attempt on King George III, James Hadfield was tried by a jury.
Mr. Hadfield had incurred a brain injury during battle, causing him to suffer from
Anne Derrick, “’We Shall not Cease from Exploration’: Narratives from the Hyde
Inquiry about Mental Health and Criminal Justice” (2010) 33 Dalhousie Law Journal
35 at 7.
170 Mental Health Act, RSO 1990, c. M.7 [the “Mental Health Act”]
169
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delusions and fits of rage. With only the options of “guilty” or “not guilty”, the jury
acquitted him with the additional note “…he being under the influence of insanity at
the time the act was committed.”171 Dissatisfied with the prospect of returning Mr.
Hadfield into the community, the court instead ordered him to be returned to prison
for the ongoing risk of danger he posed to public safety. This decision prompted the
Criminal Lunatics Act172 in Britain. This act added a third option to the potential
verdicts allowable in an effort to avoid Mr. Hadfield’s situation from happening
again – the verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity”173 (hereinafter referred to as
“NGRI”). If this verdict was given to an accused person, they would be placed in an
asylum instead of in jail.
In Canada, a similar approach was taken. Until 1992, section 542(2) of the Criminal
Code174 allowed for a “lieutenant-governor” warrant for those found NGRI, while
section 543(7)175 allowed for the accused to be detained if they were unfit to stand
trial on account of their insanity. The name for these warrants was such because the
person was to be kept in custody “until the pleasure of the lieutenant governor of
the province is known”. 176 These provisions gave absolute discretion to the
lieutenant-governor. The choices open to them included the ability to discharge the
person “if satisfied it was in the accused’s best interests and not contrary to the
public interest”,177 or to keep them at the asylum. If a discharge was to be granted, it
could be done with conditions, or absolutely.
In addition to the absolute discretion given to the lieutenant-general, a number of
other criticisms of the system emerged. Timing was an issue, as there were no time
R. v Hadfield (1800), 27 State Tr. 1281 (UK HL).
Criminal Lunatics Act, SC 1892, c 29.
173 Joan Barrett & Riun Shandler, Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law,
(Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) at 1-1.
174 Supra, note 5 s. 542(2) (since replaced by section 614(2), and further still,
repealed in 1991).
175 Ibid, s. 543(7) (since replaced by section 615(7), and further still, repealed in
1991).
176 Supra, note 173 at 1-2.
177 Ibid.
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limits to make the order, or to review the order made.178 Once a finding of NGRI or
unfitness was made, detention of the accused was automatic without any procedural
rights to make submissions or adduce evidence of their current mental health.179
Additionally, there were no appeal right from these warrants.180 The focus of this
regime was on custody, and not treatment, leaving accused persons exposed to
intrusive and unwanted medical treatments. This fact, and the potentially neverending detention in an asylum, meant the defence was rarely raised by
defendants.181
In 1969, Provincial Review Boards were added to the Criminal Code to consider the
cases of those held in custody pursuant to the NGRI and fitness provisions.182
Despite this new mechanism, the problems persisted as the lieutenant-governor was
not bound by the Board’s recommendation.183 In 1976, a commission was chartered
to analyze the regime, ultimately making 42 recommendations.184 This led to the
Department of Justice carrying out additional studies and consultations, which
resulted in the Mental Disorder Project in 1982.185 Following 2 years of research,
and the simultaneous release of the Charter, the project released its draft report in
1984 to identify several shortcomings in the legislation. They recommended
changes to bring the law in compliance with the Charter, where arguments were
already being raised under sections 7 - the right to life, liberty and security of the
person, 9 - the right not to be arbitrarily detained, 12 - the right not to be subjected
to cruel and unusual treatment, and 15(1) - the right to equal protection under the
law.186 The first major call for change related to the indefinite confinement of the

Ibid.
Ibid, at 1-3.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
182 Currently found in supra, note 5 s. 672.38.
183 Supra, note 173 at 1-4.
184 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Mental Disorder in the Criminal Process
(Ottawa: 1976).
185 Supra, note 173 at 1-5,
186 Ibid at 1-4 – 1-5.
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unfit accused without a requirement for the Crown to establish a prima facie case.187
The second recommendation was to stop the automatic detention of those found
NGRI without evidence that they pose a risk of danger to the public.188 Legislation to
address these issues was drafted in 1986, but came to a halt due to the controversy
surrounding cost implications for the new processes.189 It was not until R. v Swain190
in 1991 that the government was forced to make it a top priority. While Swain
assisted with some of the issues of the lieutenant-governor system, many issues
continue.

3.1.ii Swain and the Criminal Code Amendments
Swain brought to the forefront the issues with the NGRI system. In 1983, Mr. Swain
had committed a bizarre attack on his wife and two infant children, resulting in
charges for assault and aggravated assault. He was initially detained at the
Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre where he was given medications which
improved his health. He was released on bail and remained out until May 1985. At
trial, the evidence showed that at the time of the attacks, Mr. Swain appeared to be
fighting with the air and talking about spirits. He testified at trial that he believed he
was acting to protect his family from devils by carrying out certain acts.191 The
Crown raised NGRI as a result of this evidence, and Mr. Swain was found to be NGRI
on all counts. Because of the automatic detention provisions of the NGRI process,
Mr. Swain was immediately detained, despite having been on bail until that point,
and despite his filing of a constitutional challenge to the validity of the section. Mr.
Swain appealed this decision all the way to the Supreme Court, where section
542(2) was found to be unconstitutional for violating both section 7 and section 9 of
the Charter, neither of which could be saved by section 1 of the Charter. Chief Justice
Lamer, for the majority, wrote that under the current legislative scheme, he “could
Ibid at 1-5.
Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Swain, supra note 2.
191 Ibid at 954-955.
187
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not imagine a detention more arbitrary” because the detention was “automatic,
without any rational standard for determining which individual insanity acquittees
should be detained and which should be released”.192 The Court acknowledged that
some detention following a verdict of NGRI may be necessary, but it was essential to
limit this to no longer than necessary to determine the ongoing dangerousness of
the accused.193
The government was given six months to respond to the striking down of section
542(2) of the Criminal Code, by way of a transitional period. This resulted in Bill C30,194 which overhauled the entire regime. The 1992 amendments gave way to Part
XX.1 of the Criminal Code,195 which included 95 sections to create a complete set of
laws dealing with the issues of NCR and fitness. While the substantive test for
criminal responsibility was not changed, it did expand the availability of the defence
to summary offences.196 The procedural changes included the presumption that the
accused’s release or detention status prior to the verdict would continue, pending a
disposition hearing. A right to a disposition hearing, followed by yearly hearings to
continue assessing the accused’s situation if an absolute discharge was not granted,
were also introduced. Most importantly, the amendments attempted to provide a
more rational and humane method of dealing with mentally ill persons, with a focus
on treatment while still protecting public safety.197 The former lieutenant-governor
system was abolished, and instead, new “not criminally responsible for reason of
mental disorder” and “fitness” provisions were introduced.

Ibid at 1012.
Ibid at 1018.
194 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Amend the National Defence Act and the
Young Offenders Act, SC 1991, c 43.
195 Supra, note 5 Part XX.I.
196 Supra, note 173 at 1-11.
197 Ibid at 1-9.
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Of particular interest to this discussion, the new provisions allowed an assessment
for NCR or fitness to be ordered at any stage of the proceedings.198 There no longer
needed to be reasonable grounds deriving from medical evidence, which often
meant that in the pre-1992 system, the issue was only coming up at the trial stage.
Instead, this now allowed an accused’s assessment to be ordered as early as their
first appearance post-charge. It provided an opportunity to have an accused
assessed as early as possible where there was concern that they did not have the
requisite mens rea to commit the offence on account of their mental disorder.
The 1992 amendments also codified the test for fitness, which had been previously
undefined. Section 2 now defines unfit as:
“unable on account of mental disorder to conduct a defence at any stage of
the proceedings before a verdict is rendered or to instruct counsel to do so,
and, in particular, unable on account of mental disorder to
(a) understand the nature or object of the proceedings,
(b) understand the possible consequences of the proceedings, or
(c) communicate with counsel.”199
The new fitness provisions provided a limited power to the court to order
involuntary treatment, including medication, for the purposes of getting the accused
back to a state of fitness. This could be done on an in-patient or out-patient basis.
This is a unique provision, as it is the only time a criminal court can compel a person
to take medication under the Criminal Code.200 This authority does not even exist for
those found NCR.201 In the NCR context, if the accused consents, only then may such
treatment be provided during the course of the assessment.

Ibid at 1-12.
Supra, note 5 s. 2.
200 Supra, note 173 at 2-11.
201 Ibid at 1-12 and 2-8; see also supra, note 5 s. 672.19.
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Since Part XX.1 was introduced, the federal and provincial levels of government
have continued discussions related to provisions that had not originally been
proclaimed in 1992 due to time constraints and controversy.202 There was also an
acknowledgment that there were other areas in need of reform.203 To this end, the
courts continue to play an important role in the dialogue. For example, the 1992
case of R. v Parks204 saw the case of an accused who was acquitted of murdering his
mother-in-law, and the attempted murder of his father-in-law. He was found to have
been in a state of non-insane automatism while sleepwalking, which was not
considered a “disease of the mind”. As a result, he was acquitted outright, causing
controversy across the country. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the trial
judge’s decision to only put to the jury the defence of automatism, finding that no
policy reason prevented non-insane automatism from being a full defence.205 The
court, did however, suggest legislative reform to deal with the defence. Such
legislation was drafted and tabled the following year, but a change in government
ultimately resulted in the amendments not being pursued.206
The new regime was also tested by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1999 case of
Winko v Forensic Psychiatric Institute.207 The court found that Parliament had regard
to the twin goals of protecting public safety and treating the offender fairly, meaning
they were to be treated with the “utmost dignity and afforded the utmost liberty
compatible with his or her situation.”208 Winko was an important decision for
Parliament, as it confirmed their new provisions were passing constitutional
muster. What Winko did change, though, was a recasting of the test for an absolute
discharge in positive terms. Now, there must be a finding that the accused is a

Ibid at 1-16.
Ibid.
204 R. v Parks, [1992] 2 SCR 871 [Parks].
205 Ibid.
206 Supra, note 173 at 1-16.
207 Winko, supra note 1.
208 Ibid ¶ 42.
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significant threat to the safety of the public, otherwise an absolute discharge must
be granted.209
In 2002, Parliament designated a committee to undertake a review of Part XX.1.210
This committee made a number of recommendations, which the government mostly
endorsed in their response. In response to Parks, they agreed that no changes
needed to be made to the mental disorder definition, and that there was no need to
codify automatism.211 These consultations resulted in Bill C-10, introduced in 2004.
One of the amendments addressed the concern of the Supreme Court of Canada in R.
v Demers,212 by permitting a stay of proceedings for an accused person found to be
permanently unfit. It also expanded the powers of Review Boards to allow the
ordering of psychiatric assessment, adjourn hearings, and extend the time to review
an accused’s disposition.213
The result of Part XX.1 was to also provide guidance with respect to the order of
assessments and bail hearings, with the former taking precedence over the latter. By
way of section 672.17 of the Criminal Code,214 the Court is prohibited from
determining bail during the period that the assessment order is in place.215
Interestingly, section 672.16 also provides a statutory presumption against the
assessment being conducted while the accused is detained in custody. The accused’s
custody to complete the assessment only circumvents the presumption if:
(a) the court is satisfied that on the evidence custody is necessary to assess
the accused, or that on the evidence of a medical practitioner custody is
desirable to assess the accused and the accused consents to custody;
Supra, note 173 at 1-17.
Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Review of the Mental Disorder
Provisions of the Criminal Code (Ottawa: June 2002).
211 Supra, note 173 at 1-19.
212 R. v Demers, [2004] 2 SCR 489.
213 Supra, note 173 at 1-20.
214 Supra, note 5 at s. 672.17.
215 See also R. v Laidley (2001), 302 AR 275 (Alta QB), confirming that if an
assessment is conducted pre-bail, the issue of bail should be determined following
its completion.
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(b) custody of the accused is required in respect of any other matter or by
virtue of any other provision of this Act; or
(c) the prosecutor, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so,
shows that detention of the accused in custody is justified on either of the
grounds set out in subsection 515(10).216
In the situation of a reverse-onus offence, the onus moves to the accused to show
cause why his detention is not necessary during the assessment.217 Despite the
presumption, it seems to be the practice that most assessments ordered before a
bail hearing result in the accused being kept in custody during the period of their
assessment.218 This is confirmed by researchers, who have found that over 95% of
these assessments are conducted in custody.219 The presumption seems to only
benefit those who have already been given bail prior to the assessment being
ordered.
For those accused who are being remanded in custody, one benefit to an NCR
assessment appeared to be the ability to be confined in a therapeutic setting, as
opposed to a custodial setting. Most people see the wisdom in a mentally ill person
being confined in a hospital, rather than a jail cell, if they are to be confined at all.
However, the reality of our system, and certainly that of the Ontario example, is that
our hospitals are under-funded and under-resourced. The result has been a number
of accused persons being detained in custody at detention centers, rather than
hospitals, while they have waited for a bed to open up at the hospital. This issue has
come up time and time again since the 1992 amendments came into force.

Supra, note 5 at s. 672.16.
Supra, note 173 at 2-19.
218 A few examples of this exist in my private practice. See: R. v Toth (26 July 2017),
London 17-48825 and 17-8443 (Ont Prov Ct) [Toth]; and R. v Farrugia (26
September, 2018), London 18-6884, 18-8138 and 18-8328 (Ont Prov Ct) [Farrugia].
219 Supra, note 173 at 2-19; and J.D. Gray, “Protected Statements’ and Credibility
under Section 672.21(3)(f) of the Criminal Code”, [2000] 44 CLQ 71 at 72.
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In R. v Hussein,220 two different accused were ordered to be assessed. They had
waited 23 days and 29 days respectively in a detention facility prior to being
transferred to the hospital, and so they applied for habeus corpus. This application is
made when a person believes they are being unlawfully detained. If successful, the
court will order their release from unlawful detention. In Hussein, the court agreed
that the effect of the holds in the detention centers, without assurances that the
assessments would happen within the 30-day time frames allowable, was to
arbitrarily detain them. The court took issue with the fact that the accused were
being detained while waiting to be assessed, as opposed to detention to actually be
assessed. In keeping with this finding, their detentions were held to violate sections
7 and 9 of the Charter.
To remedy the issue, the Ontario government made promises in 2006 for more
forensic hospital beds.221 Despite this, there has been an ongoing saga since Hussein
of bed shortages. In 2007, in R. v Rosete,222 Justice Schneider referred to the Centre
for Addiction and Mental Health in Toronto’s evidence that their center runs at 103
– 105% of its capacity, with wait times as high as six weeks. This is because their
forensic psychiatric beds have a multiplicity of uses, including in-custody
assessments pursuant to the Mental Health Act, treatment orders in respect of unfit
accused, hospital assessment orders under the fitness and NCR provisions, and
some other narrow forensic assessment options.223 The last decade has seen little
improvement to the situation, with psychiatric beds continuing to be in high
demand, while being underfunded.224 In recent years, transfer of accused to
hospitals for these assessments has seemingly ceased to be the norm. Now, the
assessments are often completed via a video link at the jail with the psychiatrist or
R. v Hussein (2004), 191 CCC (3d) 113 (Ont SCJ) [Hussein].
Supra, note 173 at 2-22.
222 R. v Rosete, 2006 CarswellOnt 2428 (Ont CJ), appealed to Ontario Court of Appeal
R v. Rosete, [2007] OJ No 3273.
223 Supra, note 173 at 2-23.
224 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016 Annual Report of the Office of the
Auditor General of Ontario, ch 3 (Ottawa: OAG 2016).
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assessor from the hospital. This resource issue will be discussed again later, as it
plays a predominant consideration in any calls for reform of the system.

To this point, much of our discussion thus far has focused on fitness and NCR. This is
due to their long history as defined concepts within the criminal justice system. But
to be sure, mental health and the criminal justice system collide more often than just
the times that fitness or NCR issues are present. The times they are not at play is
often when the courts stumble around the issue the most, as there is little guidance
otherwise provided by the Criminal Code. As we have already seen in Parks, issues
regarding the mens rea element of an offence can come up, such that the person has
a complete defence to the charge. Other times, the combination of factors will simply
be a feature to consider for sentencing. In the following section, we will first review
what situations are expressly provided for in the Criminal Code. We will also look to
some other options potentially open to accused, like the mental health courts and
the Mental Health Act. Understanding what is covered will assist our discussion,
such that we can then focus on what is not accounted for and where there is room
for improvement.

3.2 What Is (and Is Not) Provided in the Legislation
“Many officers come to understand that the Criminal Code is the Mental
Health Act of last resort, but unlike the Mental Health Act, it has enough teeth
to hold onto the patient for long enough to offer the prospect of some
meaningful intervention. They consequently charge the patient in the hope
that he will get trapped in the filter of the criminal justice system. Clinicians
see many police synopses of arrests of likely mentally disordered accused
conclude with words to the effect ‘this accused should be held for a
psychiatric evaluation.” (emphasis is mine)225
If we know that some police officers charge those they believe to be suffering from a
mental illness in the purposeful hope of “trapping them” in the criminal justice filter,
then we need to be vigilant about offering services to those accused persons to
achieve the intended effect of helping them. While this approach by police and the
225
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courts should be avoided entirely, it is incumbent on our justice system to balance
the harm done by such arrests by at least providing the help to the accused person
the police officer was looking for. Unfortunately, it is probably not a far stretch to
argue that those making decisions on bail also sometimes detain accused persons
with mental health issues as a means of “assisting” them. Therefore, we need to start
seriously considering what options we have to truly help these persons.

3.2.i Section 672.11 of the Criminal Code
To answer the question of “what can the criminal justice system offer mentally-ill
accused persons?” we can begin with what we know for sure thus far: accused can
be assessed under section 672.11 of the Criminal Code for questions of fitness and
NCR. As we have come to learn, fitness assessments answer the question of whether
an accused is able to conduct a defence.226 An implicit requirement, then, is that the
accused be presenting at the time of their court appearance, as unfit.
NCR assessments are interested in diseases of the mind,227 occurring at the time of
the commission of the offence, that may exempt a person from criminal
responsibility.228 Section 16(1) provides that a person is not criminally responsible
for otherwise criminal behavior if their mental disorder rendered them “incapable
of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission, or of knowing that it
was wrong”.229 Courts have been asked to define “disease of the mind”, with one
court explaining “…in a legal sense “disease of the mind” embraces any illness,
disorder or abnormal condition which impairs the human mind and its functioning,
excluding however, self-induced states caused by alcohol or drugs, as well as
transitory mental states such as hysteria or concussion”.230
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Also provided for in section 672.11 is the ability to assess a female person charged
with the death of her newly-born child, to determine if there was a disturbance of
the balance of her mind,231 and another option to determine whether a finding of
“high-risk” should be revoked against an accused.232 Two further assessment
options are add-ons to the NCR and fitness regimes, allowing for assessments to
either determine the appropriate disposition for an accused following an NCR or
“unfit” finding,233 or to assess whether matters should be stayed against an accused
following a verdict of unfit to stand trial.234
The assessments under section 672.11 have been litigated such that we now know
the section to provide an exhaustive list of the circumstances under which an
accused can be assessed for their mental health under the Criminal Code.235 Courts
have specifically held that the section does not allow an order for assessment to
determine whether the accused suffers from a specific mental disorder.236 Another
court has allowed the assessor to make a diagnosis during a section 672.11
assessment, so long as the original purpose of the assessment fits one of the
enumerated provisions.237 These cases clearly demonstrate the courts inability to
read into the Criminal Code an option for the accused to be assessed for issues not
directly raised by section 672.11.
Common sense, and a single day observing at a local court house, tells us though
that mental health issues are prevalent a lot more often than those enumerated
times. As Dr. Bloom and Judge Schneider have pointed out, “there are other

Supra, note 5 s. 672.11(c).
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236 R. v Gray (2002), 169 CCC (3d) 194 (BSSC).
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junctures at which it can be most important”.238 So what about the rest of our
mentally ill accused persons? What options are there for them?

3.2.ii Mens Rea Considerations
First, we can consider whether the person’s mental illness might impact the Crown’s
ability to prove the mens rea of the offence. While individuals are presumed to
intend the consequences of their actions,239 mental illness can be relevant to an
accused’s mental intentions, even if it does not negate their intentions such that NCR
is available to them. It has been written that “criminal responsibility is not an all or
nothing matter”.240 In a 1963 case of R. v More, the Supreme Court of Canada was
willing to recognize that evidence of a mental illness was relevant to the issue of
whether the accused had the capacity to formulate the requisite intent for the
offence charged.241 In More, the issue became relevant in determining whether the
accused had committed capital, or deliberate, murder.242 The court held that
evidence of his depressive psychosis should have been left with the jury with a
stronger emphasis from the trial judge, such that it may have left them open to
believe the shooting of his wife was impulsive rather than planned. This was
significant because lack of planning or deliberation meant that he would have
instead only been found guilty of non-capital murder. 243 This distinction would have
allowed for more liberal parole rights for Mr. More.
Similarly, in R. v Jacquard,244 the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the ability of a
person’s mental disorder to negate the mens rea needed for first degree murder.
Supra, note 168 at 153.
Supra, note 173 at 6-1.
240 Ibid at 6-2.
241 R. v More, [1963] 3 CCC 289 (SCC) [More].
242 In today’s Criminal Code, capital murder is first degree murder. See section
231(2).
243 In today’s Criminal Code, non-capital murder is second degree murder. See
section 231(1).
244 R. v Jacquard, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 314.
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Too, in McMartin v the Queen,245 the courts confirmed the impact of mental
disorders on questions of mens rea. Negation of the mens rea, and even sometimes
the actus reus, has been confirmed to be possible for a myriad of offences, and not
just the most serious like murder.246 This is important because it means a lower
level of culpability should attach to the accused person. It also means that they are
more likely to receive a sentence that is in keeping with their specific circumstances,
namely having a mental illness.
While it is welcomed news that a person would not be held responsible for a crime
for which they did not have the requisite mens rea, this does little to address the
underlying mental illness that allowed for them to be found not guilty, or at least
only guilty of a less serious crime. It is anticipated that some may say it is not the
role of the criminal justice system to provide this help. Those persons would argue
that the role is to establish guilt and punish those who are found to be guilty.
However, this narrow approach to the system needs to be re-imagined if we are
interested in truly reducing crime and being a just society. These missed
opportunities to help mentally ill persons who find themselves intertwined in the
criminal system means that we are implicitly, and hopefully unintentionally,
allowing for further crime. Only finding someone guilty for a lesser-included offence,
without further assisting them with the root cause of their problem continues to be
problematic. Sentencing judges, like those who decide bail, are also lacking in
options to help those mentally ill persons they found to be guilty.

McMartin v The Queen, [1964] SCR 484.
R v Sesay, 2018 MBPC 39 (CanLII), speaking about offences generally. See also R v
Hayden, 1990 CanLII 7307 (NB QB), which left open the potential for mental
disorder to negate mens rea for attempted murder, but on the specific facts of this
case, it did not.
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3.2.iii Sentencing Considerations
Another time that mental health considerations play a part is during sentencing
considerations.247 Not only do they get considered for the judge in coming to an
appropriate sentence, but they can also drive the recommendations made during
that sentence. For example, if the court believes that an offender’s mental health
played a part in their offending behavior, probation with terms for counseling will
likely be ordered. A court may also be more inclined to avoid a custodial sentence,
or to grant an otherwise more lenient sentence, if they believe the offender can be
rehabilitated on account of the impact their mental health played at the time of the
offence, rather than the underlying reason for the criminality being non-medical.
While sentencing judges have more power to order offenders into counseling as part
of their sentence, courts have confirmed several times that there is no jurisdiction to
order a psychiatric assessment for the purposes of sentencing.248 The downfall to
this, of course, is that if psychiatric evidence does not already exist at the time of
sentencing, the court will be forced to try and craft a sentence that is not fully
informed, and based on speculation.
The ability of a court to order counseling and assessments through their sentences
is certainly a start to helping those mentally ill persons who are found guilty of
committing criminal offences. This does nothing, though, to help those same guilty
people at the earliest possible opportunity upon entry into the criminal justice
system. The time between a charge being laid, and resolution of that charge either
by guilty plea or finding of guilt at trial can be months, sometimes years. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of Canada has held that up to 18 months at the provincial court level,
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and 30 months at the Superior Court level is presumably appropriate.249 These
types of time lapses, for an diagnosed or untreated mentally ill offender, can have
negative and dire consequences. While we may hope that the accused has good
counsel to assist them with getting the help they need independently of the criminal
justice system, this ignores the fact that many Canadians continue to go
unrepresented each year in our justice system. It also ignores the inability for many
accused to afford the type of counseling or treatment they need, which often is
unable to be mitigated by the mere fact that they do have counsel. When courts do
order counseling as part of their sentence, the assistance ordered may be misguided
if the court does not have information otherwise available to them about the
offender’s mental health. Further in the process, the Probation Officer given carriage
of a mentally ill person’s file may also be ill informed on how to better assist them as
it relates to setting them up with the proper counselling. Further, we miss the
opportunity to help those who are struggling with undiagnosed or untreated mental
health issues who may never be found guilty of an offence, either because they are
innocent, there is a lack of evidence for conviction, or because their charges were
otherwise diverted or withdrawn. These missed opportunities will play a prevalent
role in this discussion as we continue on.

3.2.iv Mental Health Courts
Another option to explore is mental health courts. They are a relatively new feature
of our justice system. In 1994, there were no mental health courts in existence in
North America. However, by 2004, more than 100 of these specialized courts were
in existence.250 This number is likely higher by now.251

R. v Jordan, [2016] 1 SCR 631.
Mark Heerema, “An Introduction to the Mental Health Court Movement and Its
Status in Canada”, [2005] 50 CLQ 255.
251 For example, London, Ontario only had their mental health court begin in 2006.
249
250

54

Mental health courts were a response to the deinstitutionalization of a number of
mentally ill persons in the 1980’s and 1990’s.252 Movement away from in-patient
hospitals for the mentally ill placed a burden on the criminal justice system resulting
from the over-criminalization of those who would have otherwise been in
hospital.253 The attempt being made by mental health courts, then, is to “redirect the
misplaced responsibility [on the courts] for the provision of mental healthcare
services back to the mental health-care system, where it belongs”.254
Mental health courts have a number of commendable objectives. They aim to divert
those who have been charged with minor to moderate offences by offering an
alternative option like counselling. Diversion of mentally disordered accused
persons has been a formal option since at least 1994 in Ontario.255 They also
attempt to expedite the pre-trial process of assessing an accused’s fitness to stand
trial. Mental health courts can often provide some treatment for the operating
mental health disorder underlying the criminal behavior. In doing these things,
these courts are trying to slow the “revolving door” that often begins when an
accused’s mental health is the driving force behind their criminality.256 It should be
noted that because there is no playbook for how each mental health court is to
operate,257 these objectives, and the ability to carry out those objectives, often varies
from mental health court to mental health court.
The move towards therapeutic justice was a welcomed one. It reflected the
realization that “the traditional response to aberrant behavior, where it is
substantially
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Richard D. Schneider et al., Mental Health Courts: Decriminalizing the Mentally Ill,
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 2 and 42.
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Accused”, Crown Policy Manual (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1993)
loose-leaf.
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inappropriate”.258 This shift allowed the focus of the courts to move towards
problem-solving,259 all in an effort to avoid the recidivism rates that were rising as a
result of the non-therapeutic model. The issues that mental health courts are able to
assist with, in addition to addressing the mental health concerns of the accused,
included often-accompanying issues like homelessness, substance addictions, and
joblessness.260 The therapeutic nature of these courts also recognizes that accused
and their victims are regularly tangled in familial relationships, and so their victim is
still likely to want their loved one dealt with in a compassionate way, with dignity
and respect.261
Treatment of the accused through these courts includes a number of options,
including psychological therapy, skills training, access to social services, and
medication where that option is being consented to by the accused.262 In offering
these options, the court recognizes the common sense premise that the reduced
recidivism linked to rehabilitation of mentally ill persons makes our communities
safer.263 The courts are also recognizing that in many cases involving mentally ill
accused, the person would not be engaging in criminal activity but-for their mental
illness.264 They recognize that not all crime is the result of rational choice. These
courts are signals to the government that the “tired mantra of ‘getting tough on
crime’ voiced in the last half-century has been an ineffective and superficial solution
to the issues or problems that were causing individuals, like the mentally ill, to come
into contact with the criminal justice system”.265
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Mental health courts have confirmed that the law has therapeutic qualities, which if
administered properly, could help improve the lives of mentally ill accused.266 The
problem, though, is that even with the introduction of these specialty courts, it may
be that the law is still not being administered properly. This argument follows, as
some significant criticisms of these courts do exist.
First, there is a major disparity in the services offered to mentally ill accused
persons simply by virtue of their geographical location. While some larger cities
have these mental health courts, like London and Toronto, a staggering number of
jurisdictions do not. This includes other large cities and small jurisdictions alike.
Thus, if no mental health court exists in the jurisdiction that the accused is charged
in, they are unlikely to benefit from the same therapeutic model that their counterpart in a different city could. This disparity could potentially be the source of
Charter litigation in the future, although that analysis is outside of the scope of this
discussion.
Another criticism is that these courts are not run daily, sometimes only operating
once a week.267 So while the court is available to assist the accused person as their
case progresses through the system, they are not necessarily running on the day a
particular accused is arrested and first found interacting with the system. In the
context of bail, this leaves accused without access to the therapeutic team – often
comprised of psychiatrists, nurses, and social workers – that could otherwise help
them put together a care plan, including appointments for assessments and
counselling, sufficient to convince a bail court of their ability to be released.
These courts also suffer from issues relating to Crown discretion. Each jurisdiction
that does have one of these courts will have its own procedure, sometimes formal,
Ibid at 43. See also: David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, “Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and
Research” (1991) 45(5) U. Miami L. Rev. at 983.
267 In London, they run once weekly on Wednesdays.
266
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about who can appear before the court. In this way, disparity can exist even
between the jurisdictions that do offer this option. Eligibility for the court is often a
two-factor consideration, determined by the Crown assigned to the court.
The first factor asks: does the accused have the right kind of mental illness?268 For
example, “serious mental disorder” has included “anxiety not otherwise specified” in
some cases, while this same diagnosis has been denied entry to the court in
others.269 Personality disorders are often determined not to be eligible for the
court.270 And perhaps most frustratingly, even though concurrent mental disorder
and substance abuse disorders appear to qualify for the court, accused with this
diagnosis are still often prevented entry to the court. This occurs when the mental
health court team of experts, often just on review of medical documentation without
ever assessing the individual in person, believes that the substance abuse disorder
prevails over the concurrent mental disorder, thus making them ineligible for the
court.271
The second factor then asks whether the type of offence is eligible for the court.
Offences of a domestic nature are often precluded272 – even though mental health is
known to play an active role in the criminality of those who perpetrate domestic
violence. This exception is particularly unfortunate, given our knowledge that
domestic abusers engage in a cycle of violence, meaning they are likely to re-offend.
Attached to this thesis as Appendix “A” is a sample Application to the “Adult
Therapeutic Court” (otherwise known as a mental health court) in London. It shows
that an accused can only qualify for the court if they are suffering from a serious
mental disorder, developmental disabilities, a dual diagnosis described as mental
illness and a co-occuring developmental disability, concurrent disorders of mental
illness and a co-occuring substance abuse disorder, acquired brain injury, dementia,
and fetal alcohol spectrum disorders.
269 For an example, see R. v Rougoor, (August 1, 2018), London 17-50789 (Ont Prov
Ct).
270 For an example, see R. v Davis, (August 22, 2018), London 18-8005 (Ont Prov Ct).
271 R. v Byrnes (September 6, 2018), London 18-8192, 18-8193, 18-7642, and 187611 (Ont Prov Ct); and R. v Robinson (October 19, 2018), London 18-8886 & 189575 (Ont Prov Ct).
272 I know this based on my own dealings with the therapeutic court in London.
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Offences that are seen as “too serious”, like assault with a weapon, have also been
deemed ineligible before. The problem with this condition of entry is that mentally
ill persons commit crimes of varying degrees, and those committing the more
serious crimes are sometimes most in need of the therapeutic attributes of the
mental health court. It is important to note that a distinction exists between
divertible offences in the mental health courts – rightfully reserved for more minor
offences where public safety is less in issue273 – and use of the mental health courts
for guilty pleas of more serious charges. It is the latter which our mental health
courts may want to consider loosening the eligibility requirements, although this
may not prove to be overly helpful to the accused person. While the judge in the
mental health court will likely be better versed in mental health issues and the
criminal law, the mental health court judges are still bound by the same limits as all
other sentencing judges. The people who use these courts for guilty pleas, unlike
those who are diverted, are not assessed and connected in the same way. Often
times, no additional treatment is offered at all. Therefore, mental health courts may
sometimes be seen as only paying lip-service to the issues of mental health and
crime.
Another important note is that mental health courts are only open to those who are
willing to accept responsibility for the offence with which they are charged. If they
do, either diversion is offered, or a guilty plea can be conducted in the mental health
court – both of which aim to then mitigate the impact on the accused’s outcome by
accounting for their mental health issues. However, those who do not accept
responsibility for the offence, perhaps because they are innocent, or because they
are too ill to see their own criminality, are not eligible. This means that where a trial
is being set, accused persons continue to go without the supports of the therapeutic
model, simply because they wish to put the Crown to their onus of proving the
offence beyond a reasonable doubt. This is problematic. Unintentionally, mental
health courts are providing a disincentive to an accused who chooses to go to trial. It
273
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leaves an entire group of accused persons, some of whom will not actually be guilty
of anything, without recourse for treatment options when interacting with our
criminal justice system anyways.
Some might argue that this is not the goal of the justice system. But when we know
that mentally ill persons seem to be “drawn into the criminal justice system”,274 it
seems negligent for us to not acknowledge the fact that legally innocent persons
who are also mentally ill will interact with our system. In this way, we are missing
opportunities to assist these persons. The question that might arise as a result of
this suggestion is whether accused persons should be forced to accept the offers of
help, were they made available by the courts. This is a complex and controversial
topic that likely extends outside the reach of this discussion. For our purposes, it is
being suggested that the assessment and treatment be entered into voluntarily, as it
is more likely to be successful under those conditions.

3.2.v The Mental Health Act
The final place one might turn to if they are mentally ill and find themselves in our
justice system is the applicable provincial mental health legislation. In Ontario, this
is the Mental Health Act.275 In fact, this legislation may very well seem like the
answer to many of the issues discussed thus far. In section 21(1), the court is given
the power to order an assessment, as it reads:
21 (1) Where a judge has reason to believe that a person who appears
before him or her charged with or convicted of an offence suffers from
mental disorder, the judge may order the person to attend a psychiatric
facility for examination.276
Section 22(1) is also promising, as it allows for admission to a psychiatric hospital
for up to two months, as follows:
22 (1) Where a judge has reason to believe that a person in custody who
appears before him or her charged with an offence suffers from mental
Supra, note 168.
Supra, note 170.
276 Ibid s. 21(1).
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disorder, the judge may, by order, remand that person for admission as a
patient to a psychiatric facility for a period of not more than two months.277
However, a few problems quickly surface, proving that the promissory qualities of
this legislation are not yet the answer. First, we must consider section 23. It requires
the judge considering section 21 or 22 not to make such order until they have
“…ascertain[ed] from the senior physician of a psychiatric facility that the services
of the psychiatric facility are available…”.278 As we have already discussed briefly, a
major problem with the assessment options under the NCR and fitness legislation is
the lack of available beds in forensic psychiatric hospitals. Availability of services is
likely an issue, then, under the Mental Health Act provisions as well.
A second issue relates to the fact that mental health legislation is not consistent or
uniform from province to province. While this opportunity may make itself available
in Ontario, it is not necessarily available in other provinces. It has been pointed out
that this issue needs to be litigated in the Supreme Court of Canada, so that all
provinces may be subjected to the same rules.279 The other answer, as we will
discuss more in depth in Part 5 of our discussion below, is for the federal
government to make amendments to the Criminal Code, which could provide
consistency nation-wide.
Leaving these assessment options to the provincial government has also led to
conflicting case law about whether provincial legislation can be invoked in criminal
proceedings.280 In Ontario, inclusion of the words “charged with or convicted of an
offence” seems to clearly signal that this legislation is meant to apply in the criminal
context. Yet, not all courts agree on this. On the one hand, we see cases like
Lenart,281 where the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed for the Mental Health Act
Ibid s. 22(1).
Ibid s. 23.
279 Supra, note 173 at 2-5.
280 Ibid.
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assessment provisions to operate such that a thirty-day remand in a psychiatric
facility for the purposes of an assessment was allowed. This was notable because it
was over the objections of defence counsel that this was ordered. The report that
resulted from Mr. Lenart’s assessment was also allowed to be used at the sentencing
stage. Similarly in R. v Neverson,282 an Ontario provincial court relied on the Mental
Health Act to remand an accused to a psychiatric facility for two months in a bail
review application. On the other hand, R. v Lawrie283 had a provincial court find that
the Mental Health Act did not confer any authority to compel an accused to submit
to an assessment for bail considerations. The concern of the court in Lawrie seemed
to be the coerced nature of such an order where the accused did not consent. Lawrie
was endorsed by Justice Trotter in his book, The Law of Bail in Canada. He writes:
“While the literal wording of some mental health Acts may ostensibly permit
an assessment for the purposes of augmenting the bail process, this is
undesirable. First, it creates a situation whereby the powers of judges acting
under the Criminal Code are determined by the application of differing
provincial legislation. Secondly, it runs counter to the spirit of Part XX.1 of
the Code. This part of the Code is extremely comprehensive and fails to
authorize the power to order a psychiatric remand for bail purposes. This
exclusion must be taken as deliberate.”284
Joan Barrett and Riun Shandler also agree with this reasoning, arguing that because
the Youth Criminal Justice Act confers powers to the youth courts to order
assessments for the purposes of bail and sentencing, it must be that the lack of this
specific power under the Criminal Code is intentional.285 They also point out that
some courts may allow the Mental Health Act to be used for assessments relating to
sentencing, as opposed to those for the purposes of bail, because it is merely
facilitating information gathering permitted under the Criminal Code,286 while no
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such power exists for the purposes of bail.287 In R. v Knoblauch, the Supreme Court
of Canada upheld the ability for a sentencing judge to direct an accused, at his
request, to serve a conditional sentence in a mental health facility. Barrett and
Shandler argue that if this kind of term is permissible, sentencing courts must have
the power to obtain information on the accused’s mental condition to craft the right
sentence.288

3.3 The Shortcomings of the Current Options
Some of the shortcomings of the options currently available to mentally ill adult
accused have already been touched on. However, other shortcomings also exist that
require discussion. Despite an attempt to move towards rehabilitation and a
therapeutic model of justice, the research shows that we still have a growing
number of mentally ill accused persons in the prison system.289 This means that the
efforts we have mad thus far are not adequate. A goal of this discussion is to
consider what other options the government should consider in order to reduce this
statistic. One such option, the section 34 assessment option available to youth
accused under the Youth Criminal Justice Act will be discussed in the next section.

3.3.i Lack of Resources and Funding
An ongoing issue with the current options is the lack of resource and bed space
available in psychiatric hospitals. This is problematic because even the most
attractive option available under the Mental Health Act, allowing for assessments
where fitness and NCR issues are not present, disallows a court from making the
order unless a bed is available. If facilities are already operating over capacity, there
is little likelihood of a bed becoming available without a court moving straight to the
ordering of that bed being made available. It seems that even where courts are
ordering persons to attend for assessments for NCR and fitness purposes, hospitals
are breaching such orders on account of the lack of available beds. A detailed
Ibid.
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discussion of this issue was carried out by Janet Lieper, who has since been
appointed to the bench. She points to the need for counsel to bring habeus corpus
applications more and more frequently in order to force hospitals to make room for
their clients.290 In response, these applications are criticized by the hospitals: they
see this tactic as unethical on account of the “jumping of the queue” that results for
that client.291 As we have moved farther away from the Hussein case, the more we
are seeing section 672.11 assessments not being done in forensic hospitals at all.
Instead, accused are being detained at detention centers where assessments are
often then occurring via video link.292 This practice completely removes the little
therapeutic benefit that was previously derived from an assessment under section
672.11. The situation is not likely to improve during the current regime of provincial
government in Ontario, as recently an announcement was made that will cut $330
million for mental health care funding.293

3.3.ii The Non-Confidentiality of the Current Court Ordered Assessments
Problems also arise from the potential use that a Crown may make of an assessment
report for the purposes of bail,294 where that assessment was either done against
the wishes of the accused, or where the accused does not consent to the contents of
the report being shared. The assessments ordered under section 672.11 can be done
over the wishes of an accused person, and where the assessment is ordered before
bail has been considered, the information contained in the report may be relevant to
their suitability for bail and potential terms of bail. Any statements made by the
accused during the process are given a qualified privilege, meaning they are not
automatically admissible. However, these statutory exclusions under section
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672.21(2) of the Criminal Code do not include bail. 295 In support of the
inadmissibility of statements made during psychiatric assessments, it has been said
that “the Canadian judicial system is based on the adversarial, not the inquisitorial,
model. Fairness to the accused requires that the Crown produce independent
evidence of the actus reus. The psychiatric assessment must not become an adjunct
to the investigatory arm of the prosecution”.296 This approach respects the accused’s
right against self-incrimination, and the ongoing need of the Crown to prove the
charge.
In response to the public nature of these reports, the answer often given is for the
accused to seek a private assessment outside of the court-ordered options. Such a
report is confidential and covered by rules of privilege when commissioned by the
defence. If a report comes back with unfavorable comments, the defence can choose
to never disclose it, or disclose it with redactions.297 The problem with this
suggestion is the fact that accused persons, especially those who are mentally ill, are
not always able to afford private assessments and reports. Those accused who
retain counsel using Legal Aid Ontario will likely still struggle to accomplish this, as
such assessments are not always authorized under the current Legal Aid certificate
program, like in summary cases.298 Where authorization is not automatic, counsel
can ask for authorization for a special disbursement to cover this option. Discretion
remains with Legal Aid Ontario as to whether they will grant the disbursement,
which is not often promising given the constraints on Legal Aid Ontario’s budget.
Some scholars have also pointed to the fact that 95% of such assessments are
completed in custody, creating yet another barrier from them exercising the right to
a private assessment and report.299
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The other answer to this problem is the accused’s right to remain silent.300 Part XX.1
encourages, but does not require, the person to participate in the process.301 This
may be short-sighted, though. There will be times when an accused wants to make
use of the opportunity to be assessed by a psychiatrist and have recommendations
made as to how to better their mental health. They may be concerned about making
admissions during that assessment, though, that will hurt their court case. If they
instead opt to remain silent and not participate in the assessment, they are also
missing the opportunity of seeing a professional who might otherwise not be
available to them to assist them with their underlying disorder.
A final option has been carved out by the court in R. v Bernardo,302 where they
accepted that under the section 672.11 provisions, the psychiatrist may be directed
to not create a report to be disclosed to the court, and thus the Crown. Instead, the
psychiatrist was directed to report back to the defence.

3.3.iii The Need for Capping Provisions in the NCR Regime
A major concern of the current XX.1 provisions contained in the Criminal Code is the
fact that an NCR accused could be detained indefinitely. Those who are not offered
an absolute or conditional discharge are at the mercy of the Review Board
overseeing their case. Only once the Review Board determines them not to be a
significant risk of serious physical or psychological harm to members of the public,
may they be released. At times, privileges can be granted to those who are ordered
detained by the Review Board that allows for community living, however, the
Review Board retains jurisdiction over the accused in such situations. These types of
orders also allow for renewed detention at the hospital, should the NCR patient
breach the conditions placed on them.
The major criticism of this system is that an NCR accused may in fact be detained
R. v Saameh, [2006] OJ No 646 (ON CA).
Supra, note 173 at 2-28.
302 Bernardo, supra note 237.
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against his will longer than if he had been found guilty of the offence and served a
criminal sentence. This is seen as such an issue, that prominent defence lawyers
have written about the need to avoid NCR assessments as often as possible.303
Parliament had, in fact, turned their mind to this issue when they were first
considering the 1992 amendments that resulted in Part XX.1. “Capping” provisions
had been drafted, which were designed to guard against the NCR accused being
detained for periods longer than if they had been criminally sentenced.304 The result
of the NCR provisions being extended to summary offences heightened the risk of
disparities between the potential periods of detention.305 Bill C-30 would have
capped the detention available in-hospital for NCR accused to the maximum
sentence available for the index offence. There were three capping categories
drafted. The first, for murder and other life imprisonment offences, also held the cap
at life. Indictable “designated offences” would have hospital detention capped at the
shorter of either 10 years or the maximum period of imprisonment for the offence.
Finally, the residual category of “all other circumstances” would have allowed for
capping at either 2 years or the maximum period of imprisonment available,
whichever was shorter.306 These caps would still likely have caused disparity, as
most offenders do not receive the maximum available sentence available under the
Criminal Code. However, this provision would have been more fair than the current
regime which has no such capping requirement.
These provisions were the source of considerable controversy when the 1992
amendments were being considered. The most obvious problem with capping,
advanced mostly by mental health professionals and law enforcement officers, was
the potential of having an accused released into the public where they still pose a
significant threat. Civil libertarians argued that involuntary certification provisions
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within provincial mental health legislation could guard against such risks.307 In the
end, the capping provisions were not proclaimed, and our system has been left with
the current system of indeterminate detention following an NCR finding.

3.3.iv Lack of Assistance for Other Mentally Ill Accused
The remaining criticisms of the current system consider the cracks caused by the
checkered options that are available to mentally ill accused. As we have already
noted, the nation-wide application of the Criminal Code does not address those
mentally ill accused persons whose illness falls short of the NCR or fitness
provisions. There is also the problem with these provisions of timing, in that even if
an accused is severely mentally ill, they may not present as such either at the time of
the commission of the offence in the case of NCR considerations, or when they
appear before the court in the case of fitness considerations.
The mental health courts, as admirable as they are, have their own set of worries.
Perhaps most concerning is the fact that they are not available across the country in
every jurisdiction where an accused person might find themselves charged.
Uniformity, along with the expansion of eligibility requirements, is needed to ensure
that the greatest number of accused persons can be assisted. There is also a lack of
clear guidelines as to who can use the court. This sometimes leads to accused
persons avoiding the court all together, because of the run-around they face to gain
access to the court. The more difficult it is to get into these courts, the more likely an
accused is to become disheartened by the process. This potentially causes them to
turn to a non-therapeutic option that is quicker, like a guilty plea in the regular
courts. Eligibility requirements are likely the result of limited resources. Limited
resources mean a need to use resources wisely. By imposing eligibility
requirements, the courts are reducing the number of people who may access the
court.
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However, for the reasons we have already explored, some of these eligibility
requirements either appear arbitrary or are applied arbitrarily, or they actually
seem counter-intuitive like in the cases of domestic offences or serious offences. In
the example of a domestic abuser who is assaulting his wife because of his own
mental health issues, it would seem such a person could greatly benefit from the
assistance of this specialty court. Another criticism lies in the fact that these courts
do not have the ability to help accused persons who wish to fight their charges, as
the court offers no services unless an accused person accepts some form of
responsibility. The therapeutic court system is also limited, just like any other
criminal court, in the type of assessments or therapy it can send an accused for
under the Criminal Code. Like the other courts, they can only send an accused for an
assessment under the existing legislation. No special legislation or assessment
opportunities are available to these courts, simply on the basis of their specialty.
This means that availability of services to accused persons working with the mental
health court is still dependent on the resources being available generally.
We then have the potential of the Mental Health Act in Ontario. Despite its promise,
we face the reality that this Ontario-specific legislation will not assist those in other
provinces. If other provinces do not have mental health legislation that specifically
account for the option of assessments in the criminal context, then a person charged
there is still without this option. Even in Ontario, where the provisions seem to
explicitly consider application of an assessment option in a criminal context, we
continue to see a lack of reliance on the Mental Health Act. This is because the
conflicting case law has likely caused practitioners to move away from reliance on
this legislation, and because of the difficulty busy practitioners encounter trying to
secure a bed.
Speaking to Justice Derrick in the Hyde Inquiry in 2001, the then-Executive Director
of the Canadian Mental Health Association in Toronto had this to say about our
justice system’s interaction with mental health:
“We have failed in this country to provide an adequate array of mental
69

health services that will both keep people out of the justice system and, when
they get involved with the justice system, will respond adequately to their
needs ...and that will take a number of things. It will take increased funding, it
will take a wider array of services and supports being available, and it will
take... increased collaboration between the justice system and the mental
health system to improve outcomes for people who are living with mental
illness.”308
So, the question that is left for our discussion is this: how do we possibly solve this
problem? A problem that has existed in modern-day Canada for at least 17 years
since Swain. A problem that seems to be so caught up in the usual political issues of
limited resources. A problem that is so obvious to those actors within the criminal
justice system, that our lack of attention to the issue seems abhorrent.
The humble suggestion of this author is that we look for inspiration to section 34 of
the Youth Criminal Justice Act.309 Accordingly, the YCJA will be our next area of
review.
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Part 4
The Solution: Youth Accused and Mental Health
Assessment Options
“It is significant that the YCJA states clearly that the youth criminal justice system
must emphasize rehabilitation and reintegration whereas, in the Criminal Code, s.
718 states only that assisting in rehabilitation is one of the objectives of
sentencing… It is questionable if this is enlightened sentencing policy for Canada in
the 21st century, given that, arguably, the best way to ensure our long term
protection is to focus on rehabilitation of all persons who commit crimes,
recognizing that, in some cases, it may not be possible. A consideration of
rehabilitation should be routinely canvassed during all sentencing hearings because
only a small percentage of offenders will remain in in prison for the rest of their
lives. Developing and implementing programming that has proven effective in
reducing criminality is unquestionable in Canada’s long-term public interest.”310
To be sure, Parliament has long made its intentions known that youth crime
legislation is to purposefully focus on rehabilitation more so than the comparable
adult legislation, given the belief that young persons are more amenable to
rehabilitation.311 The introduction of the Youth Criminal Justice Act312 signaled this
renewed emphasis on rehabilitation for young persons, as it was less predominant
in the earlier days of the Young Offenders Act,313 and the Juvenile Delinquents Act314
before that. Rehabilitation, as an explicit objective for young persons, has also been
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada.315
Before comparing the youth situation to the adult situation, it is important to note
that bail rules are also statutorily different for youth. We will first explore these
differences.
Sherri Davis-Barron, Canadian Youth & the Criminal Law, (Markham: LexisNexis
Canada Inc., 2009) at 154-155.
311 Department of Justice, A Strategy for the Renewal of Youth Justice (Ottawa:
Ministry of Supply and Services, 1998).
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4.1 Youth Bail Principles
The YCJA tells us that the bail provisions in the Criminal Code apply to young
persons, “except to the extent that these provisions are inconsistent or excluded by
the YCJA”.316 Sections 29 through 31 then go on to make it more difficult to detain a
young person at the pre-trial stage, compared to an adult accused.317
For example, section 29(1) denies the ability of a court to detain a young person in
pre-trial as a substitute for child protection, mental health, or social measures. Given
our review of the general bail laws, and the need for the Crown to show cause for
detention on the primary, secondary, or tertiary grounds, this might seem like an
obvious proposition. However, it was likely required as a reaction to the Supreme
Court of Canada ruling in R. v J.J.M.318 in 1993, where the majority held that it was
appropriate to order a young person to two years of open custody for three
property offences and a breach of probation. They agreed this was appropriate, in
part, because the young person’s home life was intolerable, and they were in need of
guidance. While section 39(5)319 was introduced after this ruling for the sentencing
context, 29(1) addresses this potential issue in the bail context.
Sections 31(1) and (2) put a further obligation on the court to inquire as to the
availability of a responsible person who can take care of, and exercise control over,
the young person. The young person has to be willing to be placed in that person’s
care.320 An ethical problem with section 29 then arises, because some communities
lack the social supports and stable housing needed for young persons who are
unable or unwilling to go home.321 The result is that courts are unable to detain the
young person, but they are also short of options for referrals to keep them safe. For
Supra, note 7 s. 28.
Supra, note 310 at 184.
318 R. v J.J.M., [1993] SCJ No 14 (SCC).
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this reason, it has been argued that perhaps the YCJA should permit for temporary
detention of young persons at the pre-trial stage, where it would be in their best
interests. 322 Examples of “best interests” include using such a measure during a
harsh winter, or where they appear to pose a safety risk to themselves.323
What makes the youth bail regime significantly different than the adult counter-part
is the presumption contained in section 29(2). It requires the court to presume
detention is not necessary on the secondary ground unless the “gateway to custody”
has been opened.324 This can be proven by the Crown if they can show that, upon a
future finding of guilt for the charges laid, the young person would be open to a
custodial sentence. This gateway is opened when they have committed a violent
offence, 325 have failed to comply with multiple non-custodial sentences, 326 or
because the offence charged is indictable with a sentence of two years or more and
they have a pattern of extrajudicial sanctions or findings of guilt.327 We must keep in
mind that these presumptions are rebuttable.328
Another difference under the youth regime is the ability for a bail decision made by
a Justice of the Peace to be automatically reviewable by a Youth Court Justice with
Ibid.
Ibid.
324 Ibid, s. 39(1)(a)-(c).
325 See R. v C.D.; R. v C.D.K., [2005] SCJ No 79, where the Supreme Court defined
violent offence to mean an offence in which the young person causes, attempts to
cause, or threatens to cause bodily harm; bodily harm includes physical or
psychological harm.
326 See R. v C.C. (29 June 2018), Chatham 18-Y84 (Ont Prov Ct), where the court
confirmed section 39(2)(b) requires the young person to have breached more than
one non-custodial youth sentence. See also R. v A.M., [2007] NJ No 76 at paras 31 and
33 (NL Prov. Court.) and R. v J.S., [2004] OJ No 754 (Ont CJ) for the proposition that it
needs to be breaches of two different non-custodial sentences to lose the
presumption.
327 These findings can be from the YCJA regime, or the YOA regime. Supra, note 306
at 186. See also R. v S.A.C., [2008] SCJ No 48 (SCC), which required the findings to be
ones that were entered prior to the commission of the offence for which the young
person is being sentenced.
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two days’ notice, or consent of the other party.329 In this way, the YCJA supersedes
the bail review provisions otherwise provided in the Criminal Code. The youth court
Justice is not required to consider a review of the Justice of the Peace’s decision, like
a bail review would require. Instead, they are able to hold a bail review de novo. The
youth court Justice’s decision can then be reviewed by a higher court per the usual
bail review provisions of section 520.330 Also notable is the right to automatic
review of bail refusal every 30 days for summary offences, or every 90 days for
hybrid and pure indictable offences, except for murder.331
Returning to the theme of rehabilitation, it is worth mentioning that the YCJA was
successful in limiting sentenced custody since its inception. However, the effect it
had on pre-trial detention was not as positive. This was an important criticism of the
legislation, as Nicholas Bala pointed out that “[t]he sudden and unplanned removal
of youth from their community and family that results from remand makes this a
highly disruptive experience for the youth and may increase their likelihood of reoffending by exposing them to negative peer influences and possible gang
recruitment”. 332 This criticism was one of the reasons for amendments that
happened in 2012, which were intended to restrict the use of pre-trial detention.
The amendments appear to be having the desired effect of reducing the numbers of
youth detained on remand.333
The extra protections provided for youth accused in the YCJA paint a clear picture of
a statute that is trying to balance the right of accused persons in Canada, the goal of
protecting our young people, and the equally important goal of holding our young
persons responsible for their offending behavior. The legislation still struggles with
Supra, note 7 at 33 (1) - (3).
Ibid, s. 33(5) – (9).
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the availability of resources, like our adult system. As a safe-guard, it includes
sections like 29(1) to prevent persons from “impoverished backgrounds or severely
dysfunctional families, or who are suffering from mental illnesses… end[ing] up in
custody simply because they are homeless and there is nowhere in the community
for them to go”.334 To fill this gap, we often see many more state actors come into
play at youth bail hearings, like child protection workers – but this, too, is
dependent on available resources.
Given the explicitly different intentions between the youth and adult criminal
legislations, both in the stated purpose of the YCJA and the bail provisions under the
YCJA, it may seem like a fruitless exercise to compare the assessment options
available to these two categories of accused. This is not the case: as so many
scholars, judges, and practitioners alike have pointed out, rehabilitation of an
offender – regardless of age – should be a top priority if we wish to reduce
recidivism.335 Because most offenders find themselves returning back to their
community while on bail, or after they have finished serving a custodial sentence,
we are doing ourselves a disservice if we do not ensure that person has the best
chance for a successful reintegration.
As my argument will unfold in the following chapter, providing these opportunities
to all accused, and not just those who are actually sentenced, will help to avoid
future offending as well. We continuously miss opportunities to help mentally ill
accused persons, with the result in many instances being that persons return to the
system with new charges, often times while still out on bail. Sometimes, these
charges become increasingly serious. If recidivism is our shared goal, then we need
to focus our efforts on the processes that have been statistically proven as
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successful, like rehabilitation. The earlier we start these initiatives, the better for all
involved.
So, what can the YCJA offer us in terms of best practices? As we will now explore,
section 34 of this Act is informative.

4.2 Assessment Options for Mentally Disordered Young Persons
Like their adult counter-parts, young accused persons have the ability to rely on
section 672.11 of the Criminal Code for assessments relating to fitness, NCR and the
other enumerated grounds. Like adult accused, the Crown must prove the requisite
mens rea for all offences charged, which may not be possible on account of the
young person’s mental health. Youth accused, too, have the options of specialized
mental health courts,336 and the provisions of the Mental Health Act, to the extent
that each are applicable.
Yet, despite these options, Parliament still saw the wisdom in section 34, which
reads as follows:
34 (1) A youth justice court may, at any stage of proceedings against a young
person, by order require that the young person be assessed by a qualified
person who is required to report the results in writing to the court,
(a) with the consent of the young person and the prosecutor; or
(b) on its own motion or on application of the young person or the
prosecutor, if the court believes a medical, psychological or
psychiatric report in respect of the young person is necessary for a
purpose mentioned in paragraphs (2)(a) to (g) and
(i) the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the young
person may be suffering from a physical or mental illness or
disorder, a psychological disorder, an emotional disturbance, a
learning disability or a mental disability,
(ii) the young person’s history indicates a pattern of repeated
Some jurisdictions have a specialized mental health court for youth. In London, it
is called the Youth Therapeutic Court.
336
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findings of guilt under this Act or the Young Offenders Act,
chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, or
(iii) the young person is alleged to have committed a serious
violent offence.
As we can see, this provision allows for assessments relating to mental health
concerns. It can be ordered with or without the young person’s consent, allowing for
assessments in situations where the court has reason to be concerned about the
young person’s mental stability. What is particularly noteworthy is the inclusion of
the wording “at any stage of proceedings against a young person”. This means that
the order can be made as early as the arraignment date when the accused is first
brought before the court, and can assist with issues directly relating to bail. Either
the Crown and the accused can jointly make the request, or the court on the
application of either party can make the order if they believe it will assist in
determining issues of release from custody, pursuant to section 34(2)(a).337
Unlike the assessment options provided for in the Criminal Code, young persons are
explicitly protected in the YCJA relating to any comments made during the
assessment process. Section 147(1) creates a general presumption that statements
made during assessment are inadmissible absent the consent of the young person,
with few exceptions contained in section 147(2).338
While the presumption of the YCJA is for these assessments to be completed while
out of custody,339 there is an ability for the person to be detained for up to 30 days
under section 34(3). The wording allows for remand to “any custody that [the court]
directs”, which likely means hospitalized custody or custody in a traditional youth
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detention center. Criminal defence lawyers and scholars alike point out the often
futile, and sometimes oppressive, nature of involuntary treatment and
hospitalization.340 This is one of the main criticisms of the current NCR and fitness
regimes. It is arguably even more concerning where an accused person might be
ordered to be hospitalized under a section 34 order without having consented to it.
This may happen in cases where the mental health issues do not rise to the level of
NCR or fitness considerations. The wording of section 34 is also broad enough that a
person who is less ill than what the provincial mental health legislation requires for
involuntary hospitalization may become hospitalized. In this way, the section 34
order is not ideal, and should include a requirement for the accused person to
consent to the assessment.
In the adult context, any guidance to be gleaned from section 34 orders should
consider the provisions that only allow for treatment with an accused person’s
consent. While the system should allow for opportunities for people to get help for
their mental health issues, it should not be able to force them to do so. Criminal
legislation that captures accused persons, as well as those found guilty, should not
have more power to order involuntary hospitalization than the provincial
regulations given explicit power over this issue. The federal legislatures might
consider revising the YCJA to also align with this philosophy.
Section 34 orders come with a significant monetary cost. Discussions with the
current youth court Justice in London, Justice Harris-Bentley, unveils that these
assessments are pegged at roughly $5000.00 each. No doubt, this is a hefty price tag,
requiring the accused, Crowns, and the court alike to consider thoroughly when to
request or make such an order.
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The advantages of such an option are also clear.341 Section 34 orders allow the court
actors to have a more complete and more nuanced understanding of the issues
facing the young person in question. Not only do these reports consider the mental
health components of the young person’s make-up, many also delve into other
issues, including learning disabilities, familial status, homelessness, truancy in
school, skills, social networks, and addiction issues. The greatest benefit to be
gleaned from these reports is the introduction of a care plan, or a plan of action. Any
community resources that would be helpful are suggested at the conclusion of these
reports. There is a clear effort made to connect the young person with the needed
supports to make rehabilitation likely. They suggest answers to real problems. This
includes giving them a diagnosis, spelling out the appropriate course of treatment,
advising where the young person is best placed for living arrangements, and, what
other services are available to the young person that have not yet been considered
or accessed.
For criminal practitioners, a significant hurdle is simply understanding what kind of
mental disorder the accused person has. An assessment that answers this question
and suggests the appropriate treatment is therefore invaluable, at least insofar as
one of the goals of the criminal justice system is to facilitate rehabilitation. In many
cases, the connections made through these assessments can then be used for
ongoing treatment. The continuity that this provides to a young person facing
mental health challenges is particularly helpful, as so many times, the person’s
mental health has deteriorated to the point it has because of a lack of consistent
treatment providers. In other words, the person has “fallen through the cracks”.

The comments that follow are the result of personal observations of section 34
reports, during my work as a criminal defence lawyer working with youth clients in
cases like R. v T.G.B. [31 July 2017], London 16-Y1600, 16-Y1646, 16-Y1651 and 16Y1658 (Ont Prov Ct) and R. v K.J. [28 August, 2017], London 17-Y1399, 17-Y1516,
and 17-Y1337 (Ont Prov Ct).
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Because adult accused are continuing to fall through the cracks, our discussion will
turn next to arguments relating to the introduction of better assessment options for
these persons.
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PART 5
A Comparative Analysis and Thoughts for Criminal Code Reform
“In 2004/2005, there were on average 9,600 people detained in pre-trial
custody awaiting trial. This meant that half of the inmates in provincial
institutions were un-sentenced remand prisoners whereas in 1995-1996, such
un-sentenced prisoners constituted only 28 per cent of inmates in provincial
institutions.”342 (emphasis is mine)
If we tie together the various themes explored thus far, a clear picture should be
emerging. Starting with bail, we see a current system that is likely better than it was
in years past - but is still in need of further reform. Since our provincial jails are
housing up to fifty percent of people who have not yet been found guilty of anything,
we need to reassess our use of pre-trial detention. Even for those who are convicted,
it has been said that “[p]risons have failed to reduce crime, don’t hold offenders
accountable to repay their victims, and do nothing to give communities confidence
in their criminal justice system”.343 Remand detention is even less promising, with
an explicit acknowledgement from the Supreme Court of Canada that conditions are
worse for inmates in pre-trial detention, resulting in enhanced credit for sentencing
being accounted for such time.344 While the efficacy of prisons is beyond the scope
of this discussion, this point is highlighted to show the need for more consideration
of those who have to spend time there on a remand basis.
Turning next to how we can assist our mentally ill accused persons, we see a lack of
options. Too often, we are detaining mentally ill persons simply because we do not
know what else to do with them.345 If fifty percent of the provincial jail population
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are people on remand in pre-trial detention, we must inquire how many of those
people are also struggling with mental health issues. These persons are likely to
spend time in segregation on account of their mental health. Segregation is not
therapeutic,346 and has been deemed torture when it is indefinite and not subject to
due process.347Even if the practice is not officially considered torture, with a mental
illness it may very well be experienced as such. As has already been pointed out in
the opening paragraph of this section, the conditions for remand detention are
harsher than sentenced detention. Less programming is available, including
therapeutic programs and access to doctors. As Debra Parkes has argued, most
prisoners come from disadvantaged backgrounds, with high levels of depression
and attempted suicide.348 This makes lack of programming especially problematic
for our mentally ill population who will struggle with their health every day they
spend in custody.
Introducing better options for treatment of our mentally ill accused will have a
positive effect on our ability to safely and more consistently offer bail, thus adhering
to the presumption of innocence and allowing us to remove mentally ill persons
from remand custody more often. An assessment that helps diagnose a person and
offers treatment options can go a long way in the bail considerations the court will
be making on the primary, secondary, and even tertiary grounds. The assessment
and ensuing rehabilitative efforts can help to reduce crime, which thus reduces the
length of one’s criminal record to be later used against them for bail considerations,
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and Social Issues.
347 Corporation of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association v. Her Majesty the Queen,
2017 ONSC 7491 (CanLII) and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v Canada
(Attorney General), 2018 BCSC 62 (CanLII).
348 Debra Parkes, "A Prisoners' Charter? Reflections on Prisoner Litigation Under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom" (2007) 40:2 UBC Law Review 629,
quoting from Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, A One-Day Snapshot of Inmates
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and in sentencing for that matter. It allows for the person to create ties to their
community, improving their candidacy for release on the primary grounds. Most
significantly, it can stabilize the person such that they no longer pose a concern
under any of the three grounds of detention. Ensuring bail is granted as often as
possible also helps level the playing field for accused persons, such that they are less
likely to be convicted of a charge or be sentenced to jail for that charge. This helps
address the valid concerns of Professor Friedland when he wrote about this
phenomenon, as we discussed in section 2.1.ii above.
The lives of many accused persons who make contact with our justice system can be
impacted in a real way by catching instances of untreated mentally ill persons and
offering treatment. It can reduce the behavior that might otherwise lead to more
crime. Following this argument through to its conclusion, then, it is highly likely that
treatment of these persons will reduce our costs outside of the prison setting as
well, including policing, court services, prosecution and legal aid.
It has been already said that:
“…for most of the mentally disordered accused who come through the
courthouse doors, the most efficacious and appropriate course is to divert
accused back into the civil mental health system from which they have
somehow become disconnected or insufficiently well-connected.”349
This is a different way of saying that our system is inadequately equipped to assist
these people, for a number of reasons. As mentioned already, our legislated
assessment options under the Code are only being accessed by those who are
severely ill such that they are potentially NCR or unfit. These options are also
unpalatable in their current format, as they could lead to indeterminate detention
for the accused person. Our mental health courts are also not an adequate response,
either because accused do not have uniform access to a mental health court, or
because even those courts have their limitations. Stepping in to help, assuming that
help is wanted and accepted, allows our justice system to redirect accused persons
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to the civil mental health stream. If we know police are laying charges through the
justice system in an effort to get them help,350 and we know further that the
government has not funded the medical side adequately to provide this assistance
without the justice system’s intervention, then we have an ethical and moral
obligation to provide that help.
Our discussion continued by moving to the YCJA. A review of the youth legislation
signals some promise that we are beginning to take rehabilitative efforts seriously.
While the focus on rehabilitative and restorative justice efforts largely depends on
the political party in power, even our previous Conservative federal government
was able to understand the basic math. Nicholas Bala, compared the Conservative
governments “tough on crime approach” for adults, causing their prison populations
to drive upwards, with the youth approach to custody. He reasoned that “it seems
clear that the federal government does not want Canada to return to its high rates of
use of courts and custody for youth criminal justice, if only for financial reasons”.351
The most promising, and transferable, feature of the YCJA is the section 34
assessment option. It has the power to drive real rehabilitation. The diagnostic
opportunities that it affords, as well as the ability to create treatment plans and put
supports in place, is truly remarkable. While this provision is not perfect in its
operation, for example, allowing for youth to be forced into these assessments
where they do not consent, it is certainly a promising example for us to look to for
the adult legislation.
The obvious argument that such a proposition will encounter is the ever-present
issue of funding. One might argue that if the courts have had such a difficult time
successfully getting psychiatric beds ordered for NCR and fitness assessments,
where will these resources come from for the new patients that a section 34 styled
assessment will create? There is also the argument that these assessments are
Supra, note 168.
Nicholas Bala, “Changing Professional Culture and Reducing Use of Courts and
Custody for Youth: The Youth Criminal Justice Act and Bill C-10” (2015) 78
Saskatchewan Law Review 127 – 180.
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costly, given our estimate that they cost roughly $5000.00 based on anecdotal
evidence. Where would this money come from? Candidly, this is a significant
challenge, and one that has no easy fix. Unfortunately, the research is lacking to
determine the costs later saved by our community following section 34
assessments. This is an area that requires further empirical study, which is beyond
the purview of this paper, but does open up a promising area of research for this
author in the future.
What we can deduce from broader research that has studied rehabilitation and its
effect on recidivism is that the two are positively connected. Custody has been
proven time and time again to be expensive and unsuccessful, while rehabilitation
and restorative efforts do work and have long-term savings.352 While money may
have to be injected in these efforts at the outset, they give us a return in the end.
This is a better alternative to “tough on crime” legislation, which has been explained
as follows:
“…tougher sentences hardly deter crime, and that while imprisoning people
temporarily stops them from committing crime outside prison walls, it also
tends to increase their criminality after release. As a result, “tough-on-crime”
initiatives can reduce crime in the short run but cause offsetting harm in the
long run.”353
To put these comments into a quantifiable context, research has shown that most
federal and provincial/territorial governments spend over 80 percent of their
budgets on custodial expenses, even though less than 5 percent of sentenced
offenders are sent to prison.354 The 2016-2017 numbers show that the average

Supra, note 332; William J. Chambliss, Corrections, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, 2011) at 237; and Curt T. Griffiths, Canadian Corrections, (Toronto:
Thomson Nelson, 2004) at 106.
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annual cost to house a federal inmate was $114,587.00.355 The most recent data
available for Ontario provincial jails, where accused are often held on remand, was
$65,393.00 per year in 2013.356 This cost is often higher for female inmates,357 and
higher still for segregated inmates.358 The cost to the public for a homeless person
who does not use a shelter after just one year post-incarceration is almost
$400,000.00.359 These numbers are grim, especially when we consider that in 2000
– 2010, annual public spending per capita went up by 23 percent for corrections,
despite the fact that crime went down 25 percent.360 In comparison, it only cost the
Correctional Service of Canada $18,058.00 annually to supervise an offender in the
community.361
Looking to the other side of the equation, being the suggestion to address mental
illness as soon as practicable, there is a lack of accessible data to tell us how much it
costs to instead treat these mentally ill persons, such that a calculation of cost
savings can be done when we compare criminal justice system costs with this
suggestion. The data that is available, which has otherwise been highlighted earlier
in this discussion, does lend support to the conclusion that treating mentally ill
persons before they become entangled in the criminal justice system leads to an
overall savings for society. However, this is an area that is ripe for empirical
research to confirm, on a more nuanced basis, that this claim is true.
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The numbers we do know support the contention that the less interaction one has
with our police, courts, and prison systems resulting from improved mental health,
the better off our community is – in terms of both economic and social costs. While
more empirical research is needed to fully understand a comparison of the costs of
arrest, prosecution and detention versus diagnosis and treatment of mentally ill
accused, there is both logic and an ethical argument to be made, even with
preliminary data. Since we know our police are arresting people who have fallen
through the cracks of the civil mental health legislation and services, we have a
responsibility to not only consider our other options from a fiscal standpoint, but
also to afford human dignity to our mentally ill accused and offer real opportunity
for change.
As Kent Roach has taught us:
“Parliament deserves much of the credit or blame for the state of our justice
system. Indeed, even in those areas where the courts have been most active,
most of this activism can be explained by the failure of Parliament to revise
and modernize the Criminal Code. Although the Court has emerged as a
stronger player, Parliament still plays the dominant role in our criminal
justice system.”362
The Courts have made it clear that their powers only extend so far, and while many
Judges would like to be able to order resources to become available, this is not
something they are able to do. In a different context, in Newfoundland (Treasury
Board) v NAPE,363 the Court accepted that there was a section 15(1) Charter
infringement for female nurses affected by the cutting of a pay equity policy. They
saved the contravening act under the section 1 of the Charter’s Oakes test, however,
because the government was facing a budgetary crisis, and the cuts were necessary.
It is possible that the Supreme Court would rule differently today in a case about
Kent Roach, “A Charter Reality Check: How Relevant is the Charter to the Justness
of Our Criminal Justice System?” (2008) 40 The Supreme Court Law Review:
Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference.
363 Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE, 2004 SCC 66 (CanLII) [Nape].
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resources for mentally ill accused persons. Indeed, Janet Leiper (as she then was,
she has since been appointed to the Bench) has argued that while litigation is
subject to limits, it can still be an effective mechanism to create a domino effect of
change for normally powerless groups of litigants.364 She went on to quote Heather
Barr, the plaintiff counsel for prisoners with psychiatric issues, who said:
“I am no cheerleader for litigation. There are, however, few groups of Americans
less popular and holding less political power than people with psychiatric
disabilities in jails and prisons . . . As we learned from the civil rights movement,
the courts are sometimes the only place where people without political power
can have any hope of protection.365”
We have seen litigation cause change in the Canadian context. As we have explored,
Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code is in existence because of the very real power of the
courts over Parliament following Swain. But we must remember it took sixteen
years from the time the lieutenant-governor provisions began being assessed in
1976 until we saw the overhaul of the NGRI system, making way for the 1992
amendments.
Some might question why Charter litigation is not the focus of this discussion. It is
true that some sections of the Charter seem apt for such arguments. Section 7
guarantees the right to life, liberty and security of the person; Section 9 guarantees
the right against arbitrary detention; Section 11(e), discussed above already,
promises the right not to be unreasonably denied bail; Section 12 protects from
cruel and unusual punishment; and finally section 15 offers equality despite mental
disability. Certainly one may consider bringing a Charter application under each of
these grounds, and arguing that because section 34 assessments are available for
young persons under the YCJA regime, it is discriminatory and unreasonable to not
have them made available to adult persons.
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If there was a practitioner considering bringing a Charter application to try and get
help for their mentally ill client, it is in this context that I would suggest bringing it.
The existence of an option available to some – but not all – accused is likely the most
persuasive way of arguing that there is a positive obligation on the government to
offer the same assistance to adult accused. This is certainly a stronger argument
than simply saying the court ought to order an undefined form of assistance, as the
Court’s natural question would otherwise be “with what authority?” If, instead, the
court has something palpable and tangible to compare and contrast, like the existing
section 34 assessment option, then a Charter application instead would ask the
questions: under section 15, is it inequitable to have such assessment and treatment
options for young persons but not adults? Under section 12, is it cruel and unusual
punishment to keep someone in custody on remand who might otherwise be
granted bail if they had a proper treatment plan? Is section 12 then impugned
because a young person who gets such treatment may not be held in custody, yet an
adult person would be, thus making it cruel and unusual? Is section 11(e) violated
because “reasonable bail” can be met with the introduction of government-funded
mental illness assistance where the accused is under 18 years old, but the adult
accused is not given the same opportunity? Does section 9 get breached because the
detention is otherwise arbitrary, since mental illness has been acknowledged by the
government as deserving of treatment before the imposition of a sentence for young
persons, but the same has not been acknowledged for adults? Finally, is section 7 in
issue given that the rights, liberty and security of an adult person are at risk due to
the absence of government assistance to address mental health concerns, and
therefore any potential bail concerns, again as we compare the assistance given to
youths but not to adults?
As the above questions highlight, there is certainly an opportunity for litigation of
these Charter issues. The emphasis of this discussion, however, is that litigation
within the current legislative regime is both an unattractive and difficult option.
First, the premise of all of these Charter argument must assume that the government
does owe a duty to adult accused simply because they have legislated the same duty
89

under section 34 of the YCJA for young persons. It is quite plausible that a court
would find youth are deserving of more protections by the government, for the very
reasons outlined by the preamble of the YCJA, and thus, an absence of these same
options for adults is not necessarily deserving of Charter critique. These arguments
would certainly be unchartered territory, and knowing whether a Court would agree
with that premise is an impossible task.
Further, finding the appropriate “test case”, despite the frequency with which
mental health issues present themselves in the system, will be difficult. Litigation of
these types of issues is complex – often months-long, if not years. Most accused are
charged with offences that make their time in custody just short enough that
litigation of such issues becomes moot. Even if charged with something warranting
significant incarceration, the lawyer then needs permission from the accused to
make their case the example. Litigation can be draining and difficult to comprehend
for those who are mentally well; much less those who are ill.
A promising decision from the provincial level of court – for example in Ontario,
either the Ontario Court of Justice or the Superior Court of Justice – also has its
limits. It usually only applies to the case at bar, and can then be used with some
persuasion for other cases. However, it is unlikely to be “binding” on other courts of
lateral jurisdiction. If several lateral courts hear similar arguments, there may even
become inconsistency in the rulings that result. This has the potential to lend more
confusion to the issue, rather than resolving it. To avoid contradictory rulings, the
answer then is to get such a “test case” to an appellate level, so that it may set a
significant enough precedent for system-wide change. However, this option is even
more costly, and delayed. Arguing something at an appellate level often takes years.
Finally, the uncertainty for success that such a novel argument would bring, due to
issues as plain as “budgetary constraints” as seen in Nape, means that such a path
may be futile even if the Court is otherwise sympathetic to the issue.
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If it took sixteen years for Parliament to make the changes necessary to the mental
health legislation in the criminal context the last time, what practitioners know is
we cannot afford to wait this long again. In a system that has been said to be
“strained to the limit” by the 2002 Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights
reviewing Part XX.1, even they “could do no more than to call on federal, provincial
and territorial ministers responsible for justice to review the resource issue”.366
In the same spirit, it is the humble but urgent call of this author that we ask
Parliament and the provincial levels of government to work together to address this
issue. We first need Parliament to amend the Criminal Code such that a provision
similar to the YCJA’s section 34 is included. A starting point for the potential
wording of such legislation is included as an appendix to this discussion.367 This
suggested provision has taken into account the numerous critiques of the current
provisions under sections 672.11 of the Criminal Code and section 34 of the YCJA,
such that the goal of rehabilitation is the primary focus, with an attempt to reduce
the prejudice such an assessment might cause the accused person. Notably, the
sample provision also calls on a judge, as opposed to a justice, to order the report.
This is intentional, as an effort to curb overreliance on these reports by practitioners
absent a convincing dialogue with the court. In this way, it is the attempt of this
author to defeat any argument that such legislation would have a far-reaching and
unsubstantiated impact on the public purse.
This draft legislation will have no teeth, though without the provinces and
territories recognizing the integral role they plan in achieving safer, healthier
communities. Our provincial governments, together with increased funding from
the federal governments, must invest in more beds, more counselling, and better
treatment options if we have any hope of curbing the increasing number of mentally
ill persons finding their way into our system. These changes will reduce the longterm costs associated with continuously dealing with accused persons in our justice
366
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system, but it will also reduce the financial and social cost of crime on our
communities.368
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Part 6
Conclusion
“Therapeutic jurisprudence explicitly recognizes that an accused enters and leaves
the criminal justice system an affected person. For mentally disordered accused,
time spent entangled in the criminal justice system has typically produced antitherapeutic results. From being the subject of abuse, experiencing a lack of
meaningful treatment, and being subject to higher rates of incarceration, mentally
disordered accused typically do not fare well. It is now a generally accepted
assertion that the criminal justice system has failed the mentally ill.”369
In an effort to repair our relationship between the criminal justice system and the
mentally ill, this discussion started with a doctrinal review of the laws on bail. It
highlighted some areas for reform, and considered bail in the context of mentally ill
accused persons. We then looked at the current intersection of our criminal justice
system and mental health, through the lens of an adult accused person. What we
discovered is that the mentally ill are not being properly accounted for in our
attempts to reduce recidivism by addressing the larger societal issue of untreated
mental health disorders. A review of the promising provision afforded to youth,
found in section 34 of the YCJA, gave us an example to look to for reform of our
Criminal Code and how we deal with adult accused.
We ended our discussion with an analysis showing how these changes would be
beneficial to both our economic health, but also our public safety. By looking at the
financial and social costs to be saved when we assist our mentally ill persons, we
can make a persuasive argument that our Criminal Code should employ a new
provision for broader psychological assessments. It is the hope of this author that
our society can continue to shift towards the restorative approach to crime that
rehabilitation offers, especially as we deal with our mentally ill. Expanding on our
promise of nearly 20 years ago in Winko,370 to treat accused with mental disorders

Richard D. Schneider et al., Mental Health Courts: Decriminalizing the Mentally Ill,
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with the dignity and respect they deserve, is the ethical and reformative move we
can no longer afford to ignore.
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Appendix A
Adult Therapeutic Court Application Form in London, Ontario

108

Appendix B
Suggested Wording for Medical and Psychological Assessment Provisions to be
Added to the Criminal Code
s. X Psychological Assessment
(1) A judge may, at any stage of proceedings against an accused person, by
order require that the accused be assessed by a qualified person who may
report the results in writing to the court,
(a) with the consent of the accused person and the prosecutor, on an
application setting out the reasons the report is being sought,
including, but not limited to, the concern that the accused person may
be suffering from a mental illness or disorder, a psychological
disorder, an emotional disturbance, a learning disability or a mental
disability; or
(b) on its own motion with the consent of the accused person, or on
application of the accused person, if the court believes a psychological
or psychiatric report in respect of the accused person is necessary for
a purpose mentioned in paragraphs (2)(a) to (g) and
(i) the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the
accused person may be suffering from a mental illness or
disorder, a psychological disorder, an emotional disturbance, a
learning disability or a mental disability, or
(ii) the accused person is alleged to have committed a serious
violent offence.
Purpose of assessment
(2) A judge may make an order under subsection (1) in respect of an accused
person for the purpose of
(a) show cause considerations under section 515;
(b) bail review considerations under section 520; or
(c) sentencing considerations where the Crown is requesting a
sentencing option that would result in a conviction.
Custody for assessment
(3) Subject to subsections (4) and (6), for the purpose of an assessment
under this section, a judge may remand an accused person to any custody
that it directs for a period not exceeding thirty days.
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Presumption against custodial remand
(4) An accused person shall not be remanded in custody in accordance with
an order made under subsection (1) unless:
(a) the judge is satisfied that
i) on the evidence custody is necessary to conduct an
assessment of the accused person, or
(ii) on the evidence of a qualified person detention of the
accused person in custody is desirable to conduct the
assessment of the accused person, and the accused person
consents to custody; or
(b) the accused person is required to be detained in custody in
respect of any other matter or by virtue of any provision of the
Criminal Code.
Report of qualified person in writing
(5) For the purposes of paragraph (4)(a), if the prosecutor and the accused
person agree, evidence of a qualified person may be received in the form of a
report in writing.
Application to vary assessment order if circumstances change
(6) A judge may, at any time while an order made under subsection (1) is in
force, on cause being shown, vary the terms and conditions specified in the
order in any manner that the court considers appropriate in the
circumstances.
Disclosure of report
(7) When a judge receives a report made in respect of an accused person
under subsection (1),
(a) the court shall, subject to subsection (9), cause a copy of the
report to be given to
(i)

the accused person,

(ii)

any counsel representing the accused person, and

(iv)

the prosecutor; and

(b) the court may cause a copy of the report to be given to
(i)the provincial director, or the director of the provincial
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correctional facility for adults or the penitentiary at which the
accused person is serving a sentence, if, in the opinion of the
court, withholding the report would jeopardize the safety of
any person.
Cross-examination
(8) When a report is made in respect of a accused person under subsection
(1), the accused person, his or her counsel and the prosecutor shall, subject
to subsection (9), on application to the judge, be given an opportunity to
cross-examine the person who made the report.
Non-disclosure in certain cases
(9) A judge shall withhold all or part of a report made in respect of an
accused person under subsection (1) from a private prosecutor, if disclosure
of the report or part, in the opinion of the court, is not necessary for the
prosecution of the case and might be prejudicial to the accused person.
Report to be part of record
(12) A report made under subsection (1) forms part of the record of the case
in respect of which it was requested, unless the accused person asks for an
order sealing the report which the court may order.
Disclosure by qualified person
(13) Despite any other provision of this Act, a qualified person who is of the
opinion that an accused person held in detention or committed to custody is
likely to endanger his or her own life or safety or to endanger the life of, or
cause bodily harm to, another person may immediately so advise any person
who has the care and custody of the accused person whether or not the same
information is contained in a report made under subsection (1).
Definition of qualified person
(14) In this section, qualified person means a person duly qualified by
provincial law to practice medicine or psychiatry or to carry out
psychological examinations or assessments, as the circumstances require, or,
if no such law exists, a person who is, in the opinion of the judge, so qualified,
and includes a person or a member of a class of persons designated by the
lieu-tenant governor in council of a province or his or her delegate.
Statements not admissible against accused
(15) Subject to subsection (2), if an accused person is assessed in accordance
with an order made under x(1) (psychological assessment), no statement or
reference to a statement made by the accused person during the course and
for the purposes of the assessment to the person who conducts the
assessment or to anyone acting under that person’s direction is admissible in
evidence, without the consent of the young person, in any proceeding before
a court, tribunal, body or person with jurisdiction to compel the production
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of evidence.
Exceptions
(2) A statement referred to in subsection (1) is admissible in evidence
for the purposes of
(a) determining whether the accused person is unfit to stand trial;
(b) determining whether the balance of the mind of the accused
person was disturbed at the time of commission of the alleged
offence, if the accused person is a female person charged with an
offence arising out of the death of her newly-born child;
(c) determining whether the young person was, at the time of the
commission of an alleged offence, suffering from automatism or a
mental disorder so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility by
virtue of subsection 16(1) of the Criminal Code, if the accused puts
his or her mental capacity for criminal intent into issue, or if the
prosecutor raises the issue after verdict;
(d) challenging the credibility of an accused person in any proceeding
if the testimony of the accused person is inconsistent in a material
way, particular with a statement referred to in subsection (1) that
the young person made previously; or
(e) establishing the perjury of an accused person who is charged with
perjury in respect of a statement made in any proceeding.
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